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Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations 
of States in the Area of Economic,  
Social and Cultural Rights
Olivier De Schutter,a Asbjørn Eide,b  
Ashfaq Khalfan,c Marcos Orellana,d  
Margot Salomon,e & Ian Seidermanf
On 28 September 2011, at a gathering convened by Maastricht University and 
the International Commission of Jurists, a group of experts in international law 
and human rights adopted the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obliga-
tions of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The experts came from universities and organizations located in all regions of 
the world and included current and former members of international human 
rights treaty bodies, regional human rights bodies, and former and current Special 
Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
a  Olivier De Schutter is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food and profes-
sor at the University of Louvain, visiting professor at Columbia University.
b  Asbjørn Eide, dr. juris h.c., is former Director and presently Professor Emeritus at the Nor-
wegian Center for Human Rights at the University of Oslo. 
c  Ashfaq Khalfan is an Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Policy Coordinator at Amnesty 
International’s International Secretariat focusing on legal enforcement. 
d  Marcos A. Orellana (LL.M., S.J.D.) is an attorney from Chile and Director of the Center for 
International Environmental Law’s (CIEL) Human Rights and Environment Program. 
e  Margot E. Salomon (B.A., M.A., LL.M., Ph.D.) is Senior Lecturer at the Centre for the Study 
of Human Rights and Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
f  Ian D. Seiderman (B.A., J.D., LL.M., Ph.D.), is Legal and Policy Director of the International 
Commission of Jurists.
    The present Commentary was written by the listed authors in their individual capacity as 
members of the Drafting Group who facilitated the elaboration of the Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
The institutions listed with the names of the authors are for the purpose of identification 
rather than endorsement of the content of the Commentary by these institutions.
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Based on legal research conducted over a period of more than a decade, the 
undersigned experts adopted the following principles:
Preamble
The human rights of individuals, groups and peoples are affected by and 
dependent on the extraterritorial acts and omissions of States. The advent of 
economic globalization in particular, has meant that States and other global 
actors exert considerable influence on the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights across the world.
Despite decades of growing global wealth, poverty remains pervasive and socio-
economic and gender inequalities endure across the world. Moreover, individuals 
and communities face the continuing deprivation and denial of access to es-
sential lands, resources, goods and services by State and non-State actors alike.
Countless individuals are subsequently unable to enjoy their economic, social 
and cultural rights, including the rights to work and decent working conditions, 
social security and care, an adequate standard of living, food, housing, water, 
sanitation, health, education and participation in cultural life.
States have recognized that everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which human rights can be fully realized and have undertaken to pur-
sue joint and separate action to achieve universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights for all.
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, all States affirmed the 
importance of an international order based on the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, peace, democracy, justice, equality, rule of law, 
pluralism, development, better standards of living and solidarity. In pursuit of 
these objectives, States reaffirmed in the Millennium Declaration their collective 
responsibility to uphold these principles at the global level.
States have repeatedly committed themselves to realizing the economic, social 
and cultural rights of everyone. This solemn commitment is captured in the 
Charter of the United Nations, and is found in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and numerous international treaties, such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, as well as in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and many regional human rights instruments.
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These commitments include the obligation to realize progressively economic, 
social and cultural rights given the maximum resources available to States, when 
acting individually and through international assistance and cooperation, and 
to guarantee these rights without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, 
gender, sexual orientation and gender identity, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other pro-
hibited grounds in international law.
Drawn from international law, these principles aim to clarify the content of 
extraterritorial State obligations to realize economic, social and cultural rights 
with a view to advancing and giving full effect to the object of the Charter of 
the United Nations and international human rights.
These Principles complement and build on the Limburg Principles on the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1986) and on the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1997).1
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.  All human beings everywhere are born free and equal in dignity 
and are entitled without discrimination to human rights and freedoms.
Commentary
(1) Principle 1 restates Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which affirms that “[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”2 The core precept that rights inhere in the hu-
man person has been universally and authoritatively reaffirmed in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, endorsed by all states at the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights, which states that “[h]uman rights and 
fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings.”3
  1. See generally Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 28 Sept. 1985, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 41st Sess.U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985) [hereinafter 
Siracusa Principles]; The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 8 Jan. 1987, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 43d Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17/, Annex 
(1987) [hereinafter The Limburg Principles]; The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 459, 691–704 (1998) [hereinafter 
Maastricht Guidelines].
  2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
  3. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted 25 June 1993, U.N. GAOR, World 
Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., art. I, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
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(2) Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that 
“[e]veryone is entitled to rights and freedoms . . . without distinction of any 
kind . . . .” The principle that rights are subject to enjoyment without dis-
crimination or distinction is contained in Article 7 of the Declaration itself, 
as well as in a number of the principal human rights treaties.4
2.  States must at all times observe the principles of non-
discrimination, equality, including gender equality, transparency and 
accountability.
Commentary
(1) Principle 2 reiterates a number of principles that run throughout the 
corpus of international human rights law and standards. 
(2) The principle of non-discrimination under international human rights law 
relates both to the enjoyment of rights, as expressed in Principle 1, and as 
a self-standing principle.5 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights recognizes both the principle of equality before the law and the right 
to equal protection under the law. Article 3 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 3 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obligate states “to ensure the equal 
rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all . . . rights” set forth in 
  4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted 21 Dec. 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., art. 2(1), 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) [hereinafter 
CERD]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 
Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 
2 Sept. 1990); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted 18 Dec. 1990, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. 
GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (entered into 
force 1 July 2003); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 
Dec. 2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 
(2007) (entered into force 3 May 2008).
  5. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 2, arts. 2(1), 7; International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 
26, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) 
[hereintafter ICCPR]; Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, art. I, ¶¶ 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 
24; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 3; Durban Declaration of the World Conference Against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.190/12, ¶ 2 [hereinafter Durban Deceleration]; Human Rights, Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/
Rev.1 (2011); CERD, supra note 4, art. 2(d); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. 
GAOR, 34th Sess., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into 
force 3 Sept. 1981).
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the respective Covenants. Article 5 of The Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires states to “guarantee the right 
of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour or national or ethnic 
origin, to equality before the law.” The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in Article 2 (a), requires that 
states “undertake . . . to embody the principle of the equality of men and 
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation . . . 
and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical re-
alizations of this principle.”
(3) In human rights law, discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclu-
sion, restriction or preference, or other differential treatment based on any 
ground, such as race, color, disability, sex, sexual orientation and gender 
identity, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, or other status, and which has the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. It also includes any 
action or omission that, whether intended or not, disproportionately affects 
members of a particular group, in the absence of a reasonable and objective 
justification, thus constituting de facto discrimination. Furthermore, in order 
to eliminate de facto discrimination, states may be under an obligation to 
adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate 
discrimination. In human rights law, such measures are legitimate to the 
extent that they represent reasonable, objective, and proportionate means 
to redress de facto discrimination and are discontinued when substantive 
equality has been sustainably achieved.6
(4) The principle of transparency is of particular importance when states act 
extraterritorially. The remoteness of conduct from territorial states and the 
confidentiality with which many international negotiations are conducted 
sometimes obscure the conduct from public purview. Regional human rights 
bodies have affirmed the right of access to public information, for instance, 
in the context of negotiations conducted between a state and a foreign in-
vestor. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted that Article 13 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to 
freedom of thought and expression, 
protects the right of the individual to receive such information and the positive 
obligation of the State to provide it, so that the individual may have access to 
  6. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted By Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., at 146, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004); General Comment No. 20: 
Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts. 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (2009).
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such information or receive an answer that includes a justification when, for 
any reason permitted by the Convention, the State is allowed to restrict access 
to the information in a specific case.7
(5) The principle of transparency is reflected in, but is broader than, the 
right of access to information under international human rights law. Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes the right to 
receive and impart information regardless of frontiers. States are required to 
engage in international cooperation in the fulfillment of economic, social, 
and cultural rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
has affirmed that governments, as well as competent agencies and institu-
tions, should engage in human rights cooperation based on transparency.8 
Transparency is also a recognized principle of trade and development, as 
well as of international investment.9 
(6) The principle of accountability has been recognized at both the univer-
sal10 and regional11 levels within the context of the fight against impunity for 
gross violations of human rights law and humanitarian law. Accountability 
may take a variety of forms, including criminal or civil accountability before 
courts or other quasi-judicial bodies. While the sanctions for violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights may be criminal, civil, administrative, 
or disciplinary, they must be sufficiently effective and dissuasive, and victims 
of violations must have access to effective remedies that have the power to 
  7. Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (19 Sept. 2006).
  8. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, art. II, ¶ 74.
  9. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Transparency, 
Issues in International Investment Agreements, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2003/4, U.N. 
Sales No. E. 04.II.D.7 (2004).
 10. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Agenda Item 
71(a), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2006) [hereinafter UN Principles and Guidelines 
on Reparation]. (“Recognizing that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from rem-
edies and reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight of victims, 
survivors and future human generations and reaffirms the international legal principles 
of accountability, justice and the rule of law.”). 
 11. See Eur. Consult. Ass., Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations, 1110th Meeting, Appendix 
5 Item 4.8 (2011). “Considering that a lack of accountability encourages repetition of 
crimes, as perpetrators and others feel free to commit further offences without fear of 
punishment.” The Committee of Ministers recommends that states 
establish mechanisms to ensure the integrity and accountability of their agents. States should 
remove from office individuals who have been found, by a competent authority, to be respon-
sible for serious human rights violations or for furthering or tolerating impunity, or adopt other 
appropriate disciplinary measures.
   Id. They emphasize the importance of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results 
to secure accountability. 
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grant reparations for the violation committed and to order the cessation of 
the violation. 
3. All States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, 
both within their territories and extraterritorially.
Commentary
(1) The obligation to comply with internationally recognized human rights 
imposes three levels of duties on states: to respect, protect, and fulfill hu-
man rights.12 Principle 3 must be read in light of the Principles as a whole, 
in particular Principles 4 and 9, hereunder. It, therefore, should not be 
understood as implying that each state is responsible for ensuring the hu-
man rights of every person in the world. Rather, Principle 3 indicates states 
may have extraterritorial obligations in relation to all human rights, in the 
circumstances and under the conditions that these Principles identify. The 
scope of these extraterritorial obligations in relation to economic, social, 
and cultural rights is defined in Sections III through VI of these Principles. 
As described in Principle 9 (a), extraterritorial obligations arise when a state 
exercises control, power, or authority over people or situations located 
outside its sovereign territory in a way that could have an impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights by those people or in such situations. All states 
are bound to these obligations in respect to human rights. As described in 
Principle 9 (b), extraterritorial obligations also arise on the basis of obliga-
tions of international cooperation set out in international law. 
(2) The extraterritorial duties that are imposed on states as part of their ob-
ligation to comply with human rights are implied both in instruments that 
are general in the range of rights they recognize and in instruments relating 
to particular sets of human rights, or to particular groups of rights-holders. 
 12. See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Twentieth 
and Twenty-first Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cult. Rts., 20–21st 
Sess., ¶¶ 236, 276, U.N. Doc. E/2000/22, E/C.12/1999/11 (2000); General Comment 
No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 
20th Sess., ¶¶ 14–20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999); General Comment No. 13: 
The Right to Education, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 21st Sess., 
¶¶ 46–48 (1999); Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, Office of the High Comm’ner for Hum. Rts., ¶¶ 47–48, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/06/12 (2005); Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre 
for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, A.H.R.L.R. 60 (15th 
Annual Activity Report), ¶¶ 44–48. See also OlivieR De scHutteR, inteRnatiOnal Human 
RigHts law 242–53 (2010); manfReD nOwak, u.n. cOvenant On civil anD POlitical RigHts: 
ccPR cOmmentaRy 37–41 (2d ed. 2005). 
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(3) Under Article 56 of the UN Charter: “All Members pledge themselves 
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization” to 
achieve the purposes set out in Article 55 of the Charter. Such purposes 
include: “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”13 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides an 
authoritative interpretation of the requirements of the UN Charter,14 has 
also come to be recognized as expressing general principles of law as a 
source of international law15 and sets out a duty of international cooperation 
in Article 22. This provision states that everyone is entitled to realization 
“through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality.” It specifies that each individual is entitled to international 
cooperation for the realization of his or her universally recognized human 
rights. 
(4) Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that: 
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms in this Declaration can be fully realized.” Thus, states have a 
duty to cooperate in establishing such an order. This prescription has been 
reaffirmed in international declarations in which states recognize the exis-
tence of extraterritorial obligations to respect human rights and pledge to 
ensure that their international policies are consistent with the realization of 
human rights. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development provides 
that states are required to create international conditions favorable to the 
realization of the right to development; they have the duty to cooperate in 
order to achieve this right; and they are required to act collectively to for-
 13. U.N. Charter art. 56–55, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 
1153 (entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
 14. See International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Iran, 22 April – 13 May 1968, 
Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41. 
It states unanimously that the Declaration “states a common understanding of the 
peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members 
of the human family and constitutes an obligation for all members of the international 
community.” 
 15. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 
(24 May). See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in National and International Law, 25 geORgia J. int’l & cOmP. l. 287, 351–52 (1995/96); 
Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments 
and Prospects, 63 wasH. l. Rev. 1, 5–6, 8–9 (1988); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The 
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 aust. 
y.B. int’l l. 82, 100–02 (1988/89); Olivier De Schutter, The Status of Human Rights in 
International Law, in inteRnatiOnal PROtectiOn Of Human RigHts: a textBOOk 39, 41 (Catarina 
Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).
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mulate development policies oriented to the fulfillment of this right.16 Such 
commitments apply in relation to all human rights, in so far as the right 
to development recognizes that “every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental free-
doms can be fully realized.”17 The Accra Agenda for Action, agreed to at a 
2008 Ministerial Conference organized by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, comprising over 100 countries, provides: 
“Developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective devel-
opment policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways 
consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, 
human rights, disability and environmental sustainability.”18 In the Millennium 
Declaration the Heads of States and Governments recognized unanimously 
that: “in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, 
we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, 
equality and equity at the global level.”19 These declarations are evidence of 
state practice in the application of human rights treaties,20 establishing the 
agreement of the parties regarding their interpretation.21 
(5) Extraterritorial obligations of international cooperation are also contained 
in a wide range of more specialized human rights treaties. The Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, among the most recent of the core 
human rights treaties, recognizes the importance of international cooperation. 
It commits states parties to “undertake appropriate and effective measures 
in this regard,” and it lists illustrative measures to fulfill this commitment.22 
A duty to cooperate for the full realization of human rights is also included 
 16. Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec. 1986, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. 
GAOR, 97th plen. mtg., arts. 3–4 U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, (1986). The right to develop-
ment has been repeatedly referred to in subsequent declarations adopted unanimously. 
See, e.g., United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted 8 Sept. 2000, G.A. Res. 
55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000) [hereinafter Millennium 
Declaration]; Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, art. I, ¶ 10. See maRgOt e. salOmOn, 
glOBal ResPOnsiBility fOR Human RigHts: wORlD POveRty anD tHe DevelOPment Of inteRnatiOnal 
law (2007). 
 17. Declaration on Right to Development, supra note 16, art. 1. 
 18. Accra Agenda for Action, Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, ¶ 13(c) (2–4 Sept. 2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf
 19. Millennium Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 2. 
 20. See Ashfaq Khalfan, Development Cooperation and Extraterritorial Obligations, in tHe 
RigHt tO wateR: tHeORy, PRactice anD PROsPects (Malcolm Langford & Anna Russell eds., 
forthcoming 2013).
 21. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 
(1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 Jan. 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 
(1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 22. CERD, supra note 4, art. 32. 
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in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which requires states parties to provide each other 
“the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings” 
relating to torture, including “the supply of all evidence at their disposal 
necessary for the proceedings.”23 A comparable commitment is contained in 
the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.24 The first two Optional Protocols to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child oblige states to cooperate in order to prevent and 
punish the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography, and the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. The two protocols require states 
to assist victims and, if they are in a position to do so, to provide financial 
and technical assistance for these purposes.25 
(6) The duty of international assistance and cooperation is given particular 
emphasis in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Article 2 (1) of the Covenant requires that each state party to the 
Covenant “undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant.” The notion 
of international cooperation is also mentioned in relation to the right to an 
adequate standard of living in Article 11 (1) of the Covenant, according to 
which: “States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of 
this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent.” Under Part IV of the Covenant, which 
concerns the measures of implementation, two provisions relate to interna-
tional assistance and cooperation. Article 22 provides that the Economic and 
Social Council may bring to the attention of other UN bodies and agencies 
concerned with furnishing technical assistance any information arising out 
of the reports submitted by states under the Covenant that “may assist such 
 23. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art. 9(1), U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter 
CAT].
 24. International Convention for the Protection of All Person from Enforced Disappearance, 
adopted 20 Dec. 2006, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Annex art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/ RES/61/177 
(entered into force 26 Dec. 2010):
States Parties shall cooperate with each other and shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
mutual assistance with a view to assisting victims of enforced disappearance, and in searching for, 
locating and releasing disappeared persons and, in the event of death, in exhuming and identifying 
them and returning their remains.
 25. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict and 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, adopted 25 May 
2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., annex II art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 
(2000); Id. Annex I, art. 10. 
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bodies in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability 
of international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive 
implementation of the present Covenant.” Article 23 specifies the different 
forms international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in 
the Covenant may take. Such international action “includes such methods 
as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the 
furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and 
technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized in 
conjunction with the Governments concerned.”
(7) Despite its provision in binding international instruments, disagreement 
persists as to the legally binding nature of the obligation of international 
cooperation as expressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Neither the drafting history of the Covenant nor sub-
sequent state practice provides a definitive answer. When negotiating what 
came to be Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the drafters agreed that international cooperation and 
assistance was necessary to realize economic, social, and cultural rights, 
but they disagreed whether it could be claimed as a right.26 No vote was 
conducted to decide between these competing views and to reflect one of 
the contending views in the text. The issue was reopened in recent years, 
when the Optional Protocol to the Covenant was negotiated. During those 
negotiations, some industrialized countries accepted the moral responsibility 
of international cooperation, but argued that the Covenant does not impose 
legally binding obligations in regard to economic, social, and cultural rights 
internationally.27 However, that interpretation is far from unanimous among 
states. There are disagreements as to the scope of the duty and its precise 
implications while, conversely, there is broad agreement that the Covenant 
imposes at least some extraterritorial obligations in the area of economic, 
social, and cultural rights. This is reflected in international declarations ad-
opted without a vote, such as the resolutions of the UN General Assembly 
on the right to food, which indicate that the right to adequate food requires 
“the adoption of appropriate environmental and social policies, at both the 
national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and 
the fulfillment of human rights for all,” and which provide that “all States 
should make all efforts to ensure that their international policies of a political 
 26. Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. 
Q. 156, 188–90 (1987).
 27. See Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the 
Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights on Its Third Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 62d Sess., 
¶¶ 78, 82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/47 (2006).
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and economic nature, including international trade agreements, do not have 
a negative impact on the right to food in other countries.”28 Moreover, there 
have been reaffirmations over many decades to cooperate internationally in 
advancing economic, social, and cultural rights. For example, those included 
in the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 8 to create partnerships for 
development to realize the MDGs lend strength to the legal commitment 
to internationalize responsibility in this area.
(8) Article 2 (1) of the Covenant specifically refers to an obligation to take 
steps, including through international assistance and cooperation, to realize 
economic, social, and cultural rights. It therefore clearly affirms an obliga-
tion to engage in international cooperation as recognized by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.29 Similarly, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) requires that states take measures to implement the 
economic, social, and cultural rights in the treaty “to the maximum extent 
of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international co-operation.”30 Thus, as noted by the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, “[w]hen States ratify the Convention, they take upon themselves 
obligations not only to implement it within their jurisdiction, but also to 
contribute, through international cooperation, to global implementation.”31 
(9) In addition to human rights instruments, the duty to support human rights 
beyond the state’s national territory also finds support in general international 
law. Customary international law prohibits a state from allowing its territory 
to be used to cause damage on the territory of another state.32 This results 
 28. See, e.g., The Right to Food, G.A. Res. 59/202, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., ¶¶ 32, 20, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/202 (2005).
 29. See, e.g., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N. ES-
COR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 5th Sess., ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1991). 
The commentary to Sections III–V of these Principles contains further references to the 
guidance provided by the Committee in regards to the extraterritorial human rights 
obligations of states parties to the Covenant. 
 30. CRC, supra note 4, art. 4. Articles 24(4) and 28(3) require states to promote and encour-
age international cooperation in regard to the right to health and to education, taking 
particular account of the needs of developing countries. See also Wouter Vandenhole, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Coop-
erate Internationally for Development, 17 int’l J. cHilDRen’s Rts. 23 (2009).
 31. General Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, U.N. CRC, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, ¶ 5 (2003). 
 32. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); see also the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Weeramantry to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which, referring to the principle 
that “damage must not be caused to other nations,” Judge Weeramantry considered the 
claim by New Zealand that nuclear tests should be prohibited where this could risk 
having an impact on that country’s population, should be decided “in the context of 
[this] deeply entrenched principle, grounded in common sense, case law, international 
conventions, and customary international law.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (8 July) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
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in a duty for the state to respect and protect human rights extraterritorially.33 
States also have territorial and extraterritorial obligations under international 
customary law to end violations of peremptory norms of international law 
(jus cogens). This includes an obligation to cooperate to bring to an end 
any serious breaches; an obligation to refrain from recognizing as lawful 
any situation resulting from such breaches; and an obligation to refrain 
from providing aid or assistance in maintaining such a situation.34 Such 
peremptory norms are relevant to civil, cultural, economic, political, and 
social rights, and include, inter alia, the right to self-determination and the 
prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery, 
racial discrimination, extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances, and 
torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
States also have obligations to collaborate in investigating crimes against 
international law and prosecuting the perpetrators. Such crimes can relate 
to violations of civil, cultural, political, economic, or social rights. 
4. Each State has the obligation to realize economic, social and 
cultural rights, for all persons within its territory, to the maximum of 
its ability. All States also have extraterritorial obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights as set forth in 
the following Principles.
Commentary
(1) The first sentence of Principle 4 aims to clarify that the existence of 
extraterritorial obligations of other states to contribute to the realization of 
human rights throughout the territory of one state in no way detracts from 
the latter state’s obligation to ensure economic, social, and cultural rights 
within its territory to the maximum of its ability. A state may not refuse to 
discharge its territorial obligations by invoking the actions and omissions of 
other states, even though such conduct may result, for example, in a lack 
of sufficient financial assistance. The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has emphasized that “even where the available resources 
are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to 
strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under 
the prevailing circumstances.”35 
 33. See also Commentary, Princ. 24.
 34. See International Law Commission, Report of the Fifty-Third Session, Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., art. 
41, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n].
 35. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 11. 
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(2) Thus, even where a state is faced with conduct of other states that affects 
the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights within its territory—
for example, if these other states permit environmental pollution or impose 
unfair conditions on trade—the state affected by such conduct is required 
to mitigate such interferences to the full extent that it is able to do so. The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated, for instance, 
that the imposition of sanctions on one state “does not in any way nullify or 
diminish the relevant obligations of that State party.”36 Thus, a state against 
which sanctions are imposed must provide the greatest possible protection 
for the economic, social, and cultural rights of each individual within its 
jurisdiction and take all possible measures to reduce to a minimum the nega-
tive impact upon the rights of vulnerable groups.37 Such measures include 
entering into negotiations with other states and the international community 
in order to improve the situation of human rights in its territory.
(3) Principle 4 refers to the “maximum of [each state’s] ability” rather than 
using the expression “to the maximum of available resources,” contained 
in Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. This recognizes that a state is required now to use the full 
range of its abilities, beyond resources narrowly defined, in order to comply 
with its obligations to realize economic, social, and cultural rights. It also 
acknowledges that a state might be faced with barriers to the realization 
of economic, social, and cultural rights other than a lack of resources. For 
example, a state might be unable to realize rights within its territory due 
to military occupation or other forms of pressure exercised by other states. 
(4) The second sentence of Principle 4 indicates states have extraterritorial 
obligations that exist alongside their territorial obligations. A state owes, to 
each individual on its territory, duties to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights that correspond to the effective control a state exercises on its national 
territory. Extraterritorial obligations differ from territorial obligations, however, 
in that such obligations can be shared with other states. A state does not bear 
extraterritorial obligations to individually realize the economic, social, and 
cultural rights of all people everywhere; rather it is bound by obligations to 
people outside its borders under the conditions, and in the circumstances 
set out in these principles. 
 36. General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. 
Rts., 17th Sess., ¶ 10, E/C.12/1997/8 (1997).
 37. Id. 
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5. All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, 
interrelated and of equal importance. The present Principles elaborate 
extraterritorial obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights, without excluding their applicability to other human rights, 
including civil and political rights.
Commentary
(1) The first sentence of Principle 5 reaffirms the principles set out in the 1993 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.38 Extraterritorial obligations 
exist in regards to both civil and political rights and economic, social, and 
cultural rights, and the character and scope of such obligations are broadly 
similar for both categories of rights. While these Principles are focused 
on economic, social, and cultural rights, this should not be interpreted as 
implying extraterritorial obligations are more important for any one set of 
human rights. 
(2) Whether they arise in regard to civil and political rights or in regard 
to economic, social, and cultural rights, the legal bases of extraterritorial 
obligations are broadly similar. However, extraterritorial obligations that 
arise on the basis of obligations of international cooperation have been 
developed more extensively in relation to economic, social, and cultural 
rights as a whole than in regard to civil and political rights. For instance, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not even refer 
to international cooperation. In Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child obligations of international cooperation were limited to the 
economic, social, and cultural rights stated in that Convention, although 
the reason for the limitation was the fact that the text referring to interna-
tional cooperation was linked to the reference to availability of resources. 
In addition, the drafters did not wish to make civil and political rights in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child subject to the availability of re-
sources.39 In contrast, when states have focused on the details of particular 
civil and political rights, such as freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment and punishment, they have accepted clear obligations 
of international cooperation.40 As the aforementioned overview suggests, 
the present Principles are without prejudice to their applicability in respect 
of civil and political rights, although they apply only to economic, social, 
and cultural rights. 
 38. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, art. I, ¶5.
 39. sigRun skOgly, BeyOnD natiOnal BORDeRs: states’ Human RigHts OBligatiOns in inteRnatiOnal 
cOOPeRatiOn 103 (2006). 
 40. See Commentary, Princ. 3, ¶ 5.
2012 Commentary to the Maastricht Principles 1099
6.  Economic, social and cultural rights and the corresponding 
territorial and extraterritorial obligations are contained in the sources 
of international human rights law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and other 
universal and regional instruments.
Commentary
(1) Economic, social, and cultural rights and correlative state obligations 
are included in a wide range of instruments in addition to those listed in 
Principle 6. Some of the most important instruments include: the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and their optional protocols; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities; and the conventions adopted in the framework 
of the International Labor Organization. The Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 
13 September 2007 may also be the source of extraterritorial obligations, to 
the extent that it reflects customary international law.41
(2) Key regional instruments providing for economic, social, and cultural 
rights include the African (Banjul) Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Inter-American Conven-
tion on The Elimination Of All Forms Of Discrimination Against Persons 
With Disabilities; the Arab Charter on Human Rights; the 1961 and 1996 
(Revised) European Social Charter; and the first Protocol to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 41. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, adopted 13 Sept. 
2007, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007); see Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr. S. James Anaya, 
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 9th Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9 
(2008).
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7.  Everyone has the right to informed participation in decisions 
which affect their human rights. States should consult with relevant 
national mechanisms, including parliaments, and civil society, in the 
design and implementation of policies and measures relevant to their 
obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights.
Commentary
(1) This Principle recalls that all people have the right to participate in and 
access information relating to the decision-making processes that affect their 
lives and well-being. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights recognizes the right and the opportunity of every citizen, 
without distinction:
To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guar-
anteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; [and] c) To have access, 
on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.42
According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The international human rights normative framework includes the right of 
those affected by key decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making 
processes. The right to participate is reflected in numerous international instru-
ments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development. [. . .] Although free 
and fair elections are a crucial component of the right to participate, they are 
not enough to ensure that those living in poverty enjoy the right to participate 
in key decisions affecting their lives.43 
(2) Human rights standards require a high degree of participation from com-
munities, civil society, minorities, women, young people, indigenous peoples, 
and other identified groups that in general are weakly represented in normal 
decision-making processes. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child lays down the principle and purpose of meaningful participation 
of children and young people, and at the 2002 Special Session on Children 
of the General Assembly, the governments committed to increase the par-
ticipation of children.44 Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women provides that states parties shall: 
 42. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 25; see UDHR, supra note 2, art. 21. 
 43. Statement on Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 25th Sess., ¶ 12, U.N. Doc 
E/C.12/2001/10 (2001).
 44. A World Fit for Children, adopted 10 May 2002, G. A. Res. S-27/2, U.N. GAOR, 27th 
Special Sess., ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-27/2 (2002).
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[E]liminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the 
country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, 
the right: (a) [t]o vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible 
for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) [t]o participate in the formula-
tion of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public 
office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; [and] (c) 
[t]o participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned 
with the public and political life of the country. 
In adopting the Millennium Declaration, the heads of states and governments 
pledged “to work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing 
genuine participation by all citizens in all our countries.”45
II. SCOPE Of ExTRATERRITORIAL ObLIGATIONS Of STATES 
8. Definition of extraterritorial obligations. 
For the purposes of these Principles, extraterritorial obligations encompass:
a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or 
beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside 
of that State’s territory; and 
b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of 
the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action, separately, and 
jointly through international cooperation, to realize human rights universally.
Commentary
(1) A state’s extraterritorial obligations in the area of human rights may arise 
on the basis of either the situation referred to in Principle 8 (a), outlined in 
Principle 8 (b), or both. Extraterritorial obligations arising under Principle 8 
(a) often overlap with or are simultaneous to those arising under Principle 8 
(b), with similar legal consequences. For this reason, the present Principles 
aim to address both of these situations together.
(2) An example of a case where the two grounds are combined is the ob-
ligation of the state to ensure that a corporate actor domiciled within its 
jurisdiction does not provide loans to projects leading to forced evictions. 
This obligation arises under Principle 8 (a) because the state has the legal 
and factual power to regulate the corporation’s conduct. The obligation also 
arises under Principle 8 (b) due to the obligation to take separate and joint 
action to realize human rights internationally. However, the obligation to 
 45. Millennium Declaration, supra note 16, art. 25. 
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provide assistance to other states in order to strengthen respect for human 
rights in those states, in the absence of any particular link between a state 
and the denial of human rights in those states, arises only by virtue of the 
obligation of a global character as described in Principle 8 (b). 
(3) Principle 8 (a) recalls that the acts and omissions of a state, whether 
adopted within or beyond its territory, may entail certain obligations linked 
to the commitments of that state in the area of human rights if such conduct 
has effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that state’s territory. 
Several human rights treaties require states to ensure human rights to all 
people within their jurisdiction. When used to refer to the scope of applica-
tion of human rights and comparable treaties, the term “jurisdiction” refers 
to the territory and people over which a state has factual control, power, 
or authority. It should not be confused with the limits imposed under inter-
national law on the ability of a state to exercise prescriptive (or legislative) 
and enforcement jurisdiction. Indeed, human rights treaties apply to conduct 
by a state party carried out outside its entitlement to exercise jurisdiction 
in accordance with international law, such as unlawfully sending military 
forces into another state’s territory without the latter state’s consent.46 The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that:
When an external party takes upon itself even partial responsibility for the situ-
ation within a country (whether under Chapter VII of the Charter or otherwise), 
it also unavoidably assumes a responsibility to do all within its power to protect 
the economic, social, and cultural rights of the affected population.47
The state’s entitlement under international law to exercise jurisdiction is rel-
evant only in determining whether a state is permitted to extend its authority 
over a person or territory by regulating conduct outside its national territory 
in order to contribute to the protection of human rights.48 
(4) Several human rights treaties and declarations do not specify the rights-
holders to whom a state owes the obligations contained in that instrument. 
Examples include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man. It may be presumed that such obligations are always owed, at least 
to those persons whose enjoyment of the human rights referred to in that 
instrument are within a state’s control, power, or authority to ensure. For 
instance, when applying the American Declaration to a complaint of a viola-
 46. See maRkO milanOvic, extRateRRitORial aPPlicatiOn Of Human RigHts tReaties: law, PRinciPles anD 
POlicy 30–34, 39–41 (2011). 
 47. General Comment No. 8, supra note 36, ¶ 13. 
 48. See Princ. 10.
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tion, the Inter-American Commission considered it necessary to find that the 
affected person is “subject to the jurisdiction” of a state (even through the 
American Declaration does not refer to jurisdiction) and therefore that the 
state must observe the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.49 
In addition, the preservation of human rights is in the interest of all states, 
even in the absence of any specific link between the state and the situation 
where human rights are violated: they are owed erga omnes.50 Thus, while 
the beneficiaries of human rights obligations are the rights-holders who are 
under a state’s authority and control, the legal obligations to ensure the rights 
in question are owed to the international community as a whole.
(5) In its decision on Provisional Measures in Application of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), the International Court of Justice noted that 
“there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating to its territorial 
application” and that, “in particular, neither Article 2 nor Article 5 of CERD, 
alleged violations of which are invoked by Georgia, contain a specific territo-
rial limitation”; consequently, it found “these provisions of CERD generally 
appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the 
actions of a state party when it acts beyond its territory.” The International 
Court of Justice called on both Russia and Georgia to “do all in their power 
to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control 
or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, 
groups of persons or institutions.”51 
(6) Principle 8 (b) includes, among extraterritorial obligations, human rights 
obligations of a global character, such as those set out in the UN Charter 
 49. Victor Saldaño v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.95, doc. 7 ¶ 20–21 (1999) (referring to “authority or control”); Coard et al. v United 
States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, ¶ 37 (1999) (referring 
to “authority and control”).
 50. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Bel. v. Spain) (second phase—merits), 1970 
I.C.J. 3,¶¶ 33–34 (5 May); General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted 29 March 2004, U.N. 
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 18th Sess., ¶¶ 2, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 
(2004). See ian seiDeRman, HieRaRcHy in inteRnatiOnal law: tHe Human RigHts DimensiOn, at 
134–35 (2001).
 51. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination Georgia v. Russian Federation, Provisional Measures, 2008, No. 35/2008, 
I.C.J. at 353, ¶ 109, 149 (15 Oct.) (emphasis added);. The Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women has also confirmed that the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women applies to the actions of a 
state outside its territory, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations 
of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on Elim. of Discrim. Against 
Women, 47th Sess., ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010).
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and human rights instruments to take action, separately and jointly through 
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally. Such obliga-
tions of international cooperation are contained in a range of international 
instruments listed in the commentary to Principle 3. In describing the obliga-
tion of international cooperation, the Principles rely on the terminology of 
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter—“joint and separate action,”—rather 
than that of Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights—“individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation.” However, there are no legal consequences attached to the 
variations in terms used in either treaty. “Separately and jointly” implies a 
state’s conduct to realize human rights can either be carried out by one state 
or by several states acting jointly.
(7) International cooperation includes, but is not limited to, international 
assistance. Whereas the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights refers to an obligation of “international assistance and co-
operation,” more recent treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 
refer only to “international cooperation.” The drafters of the latter treaties 
took the view that international cooperation comprises international assis-
tance. The Declaration on the Right to Development similarly only refers 
to international cooperation. International cooperation must be understood 
broadly to include the development of international rules to establish an 
enabling environment for the realization of human rights and the provision 
of financial or technical assistance.52 It also includes an obligation to refrain 
from nullifying or impairing human rights in other countries and to ensure 
that non-state actors whose conduct the state is in a position to influence 
are prohibited from impairing the enjoyment of such rights.
9. Scope of jurisdiction.
A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural 
rights in any of the following:
a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether or 
not such control is exercised in accordance with international law; 
b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects 
on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or 
outside its territory; 
c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its 
executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to exercise decisive 
 52. See Princs. 29, 33.
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influence or to take measures to realize economic, social, and cultural rights 
extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.
Commentary
(1) Principle 9 defines the situations in which obligations corresponding to 
a state’s undertaking to comply with human rights may arise, although such 
situations may occur outside its national territory. 
(2) Jurisdiction is essentially an application of state power or authority to 
act pursuant to or as an expression of sovereignty. Jurisdiction has served 
notoriously as a doctrinal bar to the recognition and discharge of human 
rights obligations extra-territorially. Conversely, jurisdiction occasionally 
has constituted a basis for the permissive or even prescriptive exercise of 
extraterritorial conduct. 
(3) Because the ability of a state to comply with its international obligations 
generally requires a state to exercise effective control over a situation by 
regulatory, adjudicatory, and enforcement means, the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties establishes a presumption that treaties are binding on 
states in respect of their national territory.53 However, human rights treaties 
are of a different kind. In the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,54 the 
International Court of Justice noted the following in regards to the scope 
of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
[W]hile the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be 
exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural 
that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound 
to comply with its provisions.
The constant practice of the Human Rights Committee is consistent with this. 
Thus, the Committee has found the Covenant applicable where the State ex-
ercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory. It has ruled on the legality of acts 
by Uruguay in cases of arrests carried out by Uruguayan agents in Brazil or 
Argentina (case No. 52/79, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay: case No. 56/79, Lilian 
Celiherti de Cusariego v. Uruguay). It decided to the same effect in the case of 
the confiscation of a passport by a Uruguayan consulate in Germany (case No. 
106181, Montero v. Uruguay).
 53. See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 29: “Unless a different intention appears 
from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect 
of its entire territory.”
 54. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I. C. J. 136, ¶ 109 (9 July).
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The travaux preparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee’s interpretation 
of article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, 
the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their 
obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They 
only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their 
State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of 
that of the State of residence (see the discussion of the preliminary draft in the 
Commission on Human Rights, ElCN.4lSR.194, para. 46; and United Nations, 
Officia1 records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Annexes, Al2929, Part 
II, Chap. V, para. 4 (1955)).55 
The Court reiterated this position in the Case of Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda,56 where it confirmed that human rights law may extend 
extraterritorially in respect of core human rights instruments. 
(4) Principle 9 identifies three distinct situations for which jurisdiction may 
extend extraterritorially. Principle 9 (a) relates to situations where the con-
cerned state has effective control over territory and persons or otherwise 
exercises state authority. The Human Rights Committee has taken the view 
that each state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights “must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.”57 For the purpose of defining 
the conditions of applicability of the Covenant, the notion of jurisdiction 
refers to the relationship between the individual and the state in connec-
tion with a violation of human rights, wherever it occurred, so that acts of 
states that take place or produce effects outside the national territory may be 
deemed to fall under the jurisdiction of the state concerned.58 In interpreting 
Article 2 (1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment—which provides that each state party 
shall “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction,”—the Commit-
tee against Torture has taken the view that “any territory” includes all areas 
where the state party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
de jure or de facto, effective control in accordance with international law. 
According to the Committee, the references to
“any territory” [. . . refer] to prohibited acts committed not only on board a 
ship or aircraft registered by a State party, but also during military occupation 
 55. Id.
 56. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 26 (19 
Dec.).
 57. General Comment No. 31, supra note 50, ¶ 10.
 58. Delia Salides de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, 13th Sess., at 88, 91 
¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (29 July 1981).
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or peacekeeping operations and in such places as embassies, military bases, 
detention facilities, or other areas over which a State exercises factual or effec-
tive control. [. . .] The Committee considers that the scope of “territory” under 
article 2 must also include situations where a State party exercises, directly or 
indirectly, de facto or de jure control over persons in detention.59 
Similarly, regarding the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the International Court of Justice has confirmed that:
there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating to its territorial ap-
plication [ . . . ] [T]he Court consequently finds that these provisions of CERD 
generally appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to 
the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory.60 
While these various statements were made under different instruments and 
in different contexts, they confirm the view of human rights bodies and of 
the International Court of Justice that human rights obligations are imposed 
on states in any situation over which they exercise effective control. Such 
obligations will sustain whether or not that situation is located in the national 
territory of the state concerned.
(5) This is similar to the position adopted by human rights regional bodies. The 
American Convention on Human Rights extends to persons “subject to [the] 
jurisdiction” of the state party. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights holds that in relation to the American Convention, “jurisdiction [ . . . ] 
[is] a notion linked to authority and effective control, and not merely to ter-
ritorial boundaries.”61 The European Court of Human Rights has indicated 
that “as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a Contracting State’s 
jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which pro-
duce effects outside its own territory.” Among the specific situations identified 
by the Court are “when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence 
of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that Government” and where “the use 
of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory [. . .] bring[s] the 
individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into 
the State’s [. . .] jurisdiction.” However, while the duties imposed under the 
Convention may be invoked “whenever the State through its agents exercises 
control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction,” whether or 
not all the obligations under the Convention come into play depends on 
 59. General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. GAOR, 
Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008).
 60. Provisional Measures in the case of Georgia v. Russian Federation, 2008, No. 35/2008, 
I.C.J. ¶ 109 (15 Oct.).
 61. Victor Saldano v. Argentina, Petition, Report No. 38/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 289 (1998), ¶ 19.
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the specific circumstances: “the State is under an obligation [. . .] to secure 
to that individual the rights and freedoms [. . .] that are relevant to the situ-
ation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can 
be ‘divided and tailored.’”62 Where a state exercises effective control over a 
territory, the state may be obliged to secure the entire range of substantive 
rights.63 Where the degree of the control exercised by the state may be more 
or less complete, so will the extent of its obligations under the Convention. 
(6) A state may, through its conduct, influence the enjoyment of human 
rights outside its national territory, even in the absence of effective control 
or authority over a situation or a person. Principle 9 (b) is intended to take 
into account such situations.
(7) The European Court of Human Rights noted that, for the purpose of de-
fining the scope of the duties of the High Contracting Parties under Article 
1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, jurisdiction “may extend 
to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its own territory,”64 
and it identified some of the situations where this might be the case. It also 
noted that “[a] State’s responsibility may [. . .] be engaged on account of 
acts which have sufficiently proximate repercussions on rights guaranteed by 
the Convention, even if those repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction.”65 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights similarly noted that “a 
state party to the American Convention may be responsible under certain 
circumstances for the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects 
or are undertaken outside that state’s own territory.”66 The Human Rights 
Committee also affirmed that: 
[A] State party may be responsible for extra-territorial violations of the Covenant, 
if it is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another 
jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extra-territorial violation must be a necessary 
and foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State 
party had at the time.67 
Such statements relate only to where the obligations of the relevant treaties 
are engaged and does not purport to express the scope of obligations under 
general international law. 
 62. Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. 
Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 138–39, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4e2545502.pdf
 63. See Princ. 18.
 64. Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, ¶ 133. (cita-
tions omitted).
 65. Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 
317, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61886
 66. Saldano, Report No. 38/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at ¶ 17.
 67. Communication No. 1539/2006 (Munaf v. Rom.), adopted 30 July 2009, U.N. GAOR, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., 96th Sess., Annex ¶ 14.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 
(2009).
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(8) Consistent with these statements, Principle 9 (b) acknowledges that the 
obligations of a state under international human rights law may effectively 
be triggered when its responsible authorities know or should have known 
the conduct of the state will bring about substantial human rights effects in 
another territory. Because this element of foreseeability must be present, a 
state will not necessarily be held liable for all the consequences that result 
from its conduct where the proximity between that conduct and the con-
sequences is remote. 
(9) Finally, Principle 9 (c) takes into account the fact that there are situations 
where a state is required to take measures in order to support the realiza-
tion of human rights outside its national territory. This refers, in particular, 
to the role of international assistance and cooperation in the fulfillment of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. The precise content of this obligation 
and its implications are considered in this Commentary in Principles 28 
through 35.
10. Limits to the entitlement to exercise jurisdiction.
The State’s obligation to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural 
rights extraterritorially does not authorize a State to act in violation of the UN 
Charter and general international law.
Commentary
While Principle 9 sets forth the basis for the mandatory application of human 
rights obligations to a state’s conduct that has extraterritorial effect, Principle 
10 recalls that the duty of the state to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights outside its national territory should not be invoked as a justification 
for the adoption of measures that violate the UN Charter or general interna-
tional law. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter imposes on UN member states to 
“refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Moreover, as 
described in greater detail under Principles 24 and 25 regarding the duty to 
protect human rights extraterritorially through regulation, the sovereignty of 
the state on the national territory of which a situation occurs that another 
state seeks to influence, as well as the principle of the equality of all states, 
may impose limits to the scope of the duty of that other state to contribute 
to the full realization of human rights. 
11. State responsibility.
State responsibility is engaged as a result of conduct attributable to a State, act-
ing separately or jointly with other States or entities, that constitutes a breach 
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of its international human rights obligations whether within its territory or 
extraterritorially.
Commentary
The question of state responsibility is distinct from that of jurisdiction as 
defined in Principles 9 and 10. Principles 11 and 12 reflect certain key 
conditions under which the responsibility of a state may be engaged in 
respect of its extraterritorial obligations. These principles restate the basic 
rules governing state responsibility, consistent with customary international 
law as reflected in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission.68 Principle 11 
expresses the content of Article 2 of the Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which provides that:
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of 
an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
12. Attribution of State responsibility for the conduct of non-State 
actors.
State responsibility extends to:
(a) acts and omissions of non-State actors acting on the instructions or under 
the direction or control of the State; and 
(b) acts and omissions of persons or entities which are not organs of the State, 
such as corporations and other business enterprises, where they are empowered 
by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority, provided those 
persons or entities are acting in that capacity in the particular instance.
Commentary
(1) Principle 12 concerns situations where state responsibility may be en-
gaged, even when the primary source of the conduct giving rise to a viola-
tion is a non-state actor. Thus, where a business enterprise, armed group, or 
other private person or entity acting under the color of law or state authority 
commits a wrongful act, that act may be attributed to the concerned state. 
The question as to whether state responsibility is engaged in relation to the 
conduct of non-state actors is distinct from whether non-state actors may 
 68. Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 34.
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be held directly responsible for a wrongful act before domestic or interna-
tional procedures. The latter question is outside of the scope of the present 
principles.
(2) Principle 12 is derived from Articles 5 and 8 of the Articles on Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International 
Law Commission.69 Article 5 concerning the conduct of persons or entities 
exercising elements of governmental authority provides:
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under 
Article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements 
of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance.
(3) Principle 12 (a) replicates this provision, which seeks “to take account 
of increasingly common phenomenon of para-statal entities, which exercise 
elements of governmental authority in place of State organs, as well as situa-
tions where former State corporations have been privatized but retain certain 
public or regulatory functions.”70 It may not, however, always be clear as to 
what constitutes a governmental function.
Beyond a certain limit, what is regarded as “governmental” depends on the 
particular society, its history and traditions. Of particular importance will be not 
just the content of the powers, but the way they are conferred on an entity, the 
purposes for which they are to be exercised and the extent to which the entity 
is accountable to government for their exercise.71 
However, even under the narrowest understanding of such functions, they 
should comprise law enforcement activities and those of armed forces, the 
provision of basic infrastructure, certain essential public services such as water 
and electricity, and traditionally public functions of the state such as educa-
tion and health. These functions may be considered to constitute elements of 
governmental authority for which the state should be held responsible, even 
if it has chosen to delegate these functions to private entities. In order for its 
acts to be attributed to the state, the private entity must have been explicitly 
empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority. However, this 
attribution applies whether or not this delegation of powers was effectuated 
through formal legislation defining their scope and conditions of exercise.
 69. Id. arts. 5, 8.
 70. Id. art. 5, cmt.1.
 71. Id. art. 5, cmt. 6.
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(4) Article 8 concerning conduct directed or controlled by a state provides:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting 
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carry-
ing out the conduct.
The rule has its origin in the Nicaragua v. United States of America judgment 
of the International Court of Justice, where the Court decided that despite 
the strong support provided by the United States to the armed rebel contras, 
the acts of the latter could only be attributed to the former if it could be 
proved that the US “had effective control of the military or paramilitary op-
erations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”72 It 
follows from this rule that however strongly a company is supported by the 
state, and however close its connections to the state may be, the conduct 
of the company will be attributable to the state only if the state controls the 
company’s conduct in a specific instance.
13. Obligation to avoid causing harm.
States must desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or 
impairing the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially. 
The responsibility of States is engaged where such nullification or impairment is 
a foreseeable result of their conduct. Uncertainty about potential impacts does 
not constitute justification for such conduct.
Commentary
(1) Principle 13 articulates the duty of the state to avoid conduct that creates 
real risk to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights outside 
the national territory of that state. In its Advisory Opinion on Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice 
“restated” the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond national control.”73 Principle 13 also finds support in Article 
74 of the UN Charter, which in the context of non-self-governing territories 
articulates the obligation of states to adhere to “the general principle of good 
neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of 
the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.” Article 
74 is thus relevant to the obligation of states to “desist from conduct” that 
creates a risk of nullifying or impairing economic, social, or cultural rights.
 72. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 64, ¶ 115 (27 June).
 73. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶ 29 (8 July).
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(2) Principle 13 stresses there is a duty to avoid creating a “real risk” as op-
posed to merely hypothetical or theoretical risks. This definition of the nature 
of the risk that may result in a state’s responsibility being engaged should 
be understood per analogy with the EC-Hormones case decided under the 
Dispute Settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization, where the 
Appellate Body rejected the idea that risks could only be established through 
laboratory methods and instead focused on “risk in human societies as they 
actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on hu-
man health in the real world where people live and work and die.”74 In the 
EC-Hormones case, the Appellate Body also referred to “ascertainable risks” 
to distinguish risk from “the uncertainty that theoretically always remains 
since science can never provide absolute certainty that a given substance 
will not ever have adverse health effects.”75 The emphasis on “real risk” 
does not, however, establish a threshold of severity or intensity of the risk: 
it refers to the probability of the risk materializing, not to the consequences 
that might follow from such materialization of the risk. 
(3) Under Principle 13, a state attracts its international responsibility where 
the resulting impairment of human rights is a “foreseeable” result of that 
state’s conduct. By introducing the condition of foreseeability, Principle 
13 sets out a standard of liability that is distinct from strict liability, and 
constitutes a strong incentive for states to assess the impact of their choices 
on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights abroad, because 
their international responsibility will be assessed on the basis of what their 
authorities knew or should have known. Foreseeability serves an important 
limiting function by ensuring that a state shall not be surprised with claims 
of responsibility for unforeseeable risks that are only remotely connected 
to its conduct. 
(4) The International Law Commission (ILC) has addressed the concept of 
foreseeability in its Commentary to Article 23 of its Articles on Responsibility 
of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts: “To have been ‘unforeseen’ the 
event must have been neither foreseen nor of an easily foreseeable kind.”76 
The ILC’s commentary thus points to two dimensions of foreseeability: whether 
the result was actually foreseen, and whether the result should have been 
foreseen. The second strand of foreseeability involves a normative dimension, 
as it requires assessing whether at the time of conduct steps were taken to 
obtain the scientific and other knowledge necessary to undertake a deter-
 74. Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 187, WT/DS48/AB/R (5 Jan. 1998).
 75. Id. ¶ 186.
 76. Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 34, art. 23, cmt. 2.
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mination of risk. This normative dimension underscores the importance of 
foreseeability as a limiting element of the fault-based standard articulated 
in Principle 13 in contrast with a strict liability standard.
(5) The ILC has also addressed the issues of foreseeability and causality in its 
Commentary to Principle 4 of its 2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of 
Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities: 
The principle of causation is linked to questions of foreseeability and proximity 
or direct loss. Courts in different jurisdictions have applied the principles and 
notions of proximate cause, adequate causation, foreseeability and remoteness 
of the damage. This is a highly discretionary and unpredictable branch of law. 
Different jurisdictions have applied these concepts with different results. It may 
be mentioned that the test of proximity seems to have been gradually eased in 
modern tort law. Developments have moved from strict condicio sine qua non 
theory over the foreseeability (“adequacy”) test to a less stringent causation test 
requiring only the “reasonable imputation” of damage.77 
Consistent with this evolution, Principle 13 allows for a particular violation 
of economic, social, and cultural rights to be attributed to the conduct of 
one state if it was foreseeable that such conduct could have resulted in a 
violation even if other, intervening causes, also played a role in the violation. 
(6) The knowledge state authorities have of the consequences of their conduct 
is relevant for the purposes of establishing state responsibility. In the Corfu 
Channel case the International Court of Justice observed that due diligence 
obligations “are based [. . .] on certain general and well-recognized prin-
ciples, namely [. . .] every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its ter-
ritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”78 However, 
Principle 13 provides that a state’s responsibility may be engaged not only 
if its authorities are aware or were made aware of the risks to economic, 
social, and cultural rights, but also if its authorities should have been aware 
and have failed to seek the information that would have allowed them to 
make a sounder assessment of the risk. 
(7) Principle 13 specifically references the precautionary principle in stating 
that “[u]ncertainty about potential impacts does not constitute justification 
 77. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, 
and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering 
the work of that session. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 
Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., ¶¶ 44–46, Principle 4, Commentary ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/10 (1996).
 78. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) (Merits) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (9 Apr.). See also Com-
mentary, Princ. 24.
2012 Commentary to the Maastricht Principles 1115
for said conduct.” This approach is widely regarded in international treaties, 
international decisions, and expert commentary as a critical tool to address-
ing risks resulting from planned activities. 
(8) The ILC has commented on the precautionary principle in addressing 
Article 3 of the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities adopted in 2001. According to that provision: 
“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant 
transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.” The ILC 
noted that it is generally understood as the principle of “taking such mea-
sures as are appropriate by way of abundant caution, even if full scientific 
certainty does not exist, to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible damage.”79 
Where there are threats or potential threats of serious economic, social, or 
cultural impact, lack of full certainty about those threats should not be used 
as a reason for approving the planned intervention, nor for requiring the 
implementation of preventative measures and effective remedies.
(9) The precautionary principle has received support in recent international 
decisions. The International Court of Justice in Case concerning Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay noted that “a precautionary approach may be relevant 
in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute.”80 
Similarly, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea noted in its Advisory Opinion from February 2011, regarding 
responsibilities and obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with 
respect to activities in the area, that: 
The Chamber observes that the precautionary approach has been incorporated 
into a growing number of international treaties and other instruments, many 
of which reflect the formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. In the 
view of the Chamber, this has initiated a trend towards making this approach 
part of customary international law.81
14. Impact assessment and prevention.
States must conduct prior assessment, with public participation, of the risks 
and potential extraterritorial impacts of their laws, policies and practices on the 
 79. Commentary to Article 3 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its 53rd Sess., U.N. GAOR, Int. Law Comm’n, 53rd 
Sess., at 155, art. 3, ¶ 14.
 80. Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 164 (20 Apr.)
 81. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory 
Opinion, ITLOS Reports 2011, ¶ 135 (1 Feb.), forthcoming, available at: https://www.
itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf
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enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The results of the assessment 
must be made public. The assessment must also be undertaken to inform the 
measures that States must adopt to prevent violations or ensure their cessation 
as well as to ensure effective remedies.
Commentary
(1) Principle 14 affirms the obligation of each state to assess the impact of 
its conduct, to implement preventative measures, and to ensure cessation of 
violations as well as effective remedies when rights are negatively impacted. 
Principle 14 is thus closely linked with Principle 13 in articulating ways in 
which states can give effect to their obligation to desist from conduct that 
creates real risks on economic, social, and cultural rights. 
(2) States are under an obligation to inform themselves about the potential 
impact of their conduct on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural 
rights outside their national territories prior to adopting such conduct. The 
obligation to obtain information in order to identify and assess the poten-
tial impact of state conduct is referred to in the Commentary on Article 3 
(“Prevention”) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 2001: 
[T]he obligation to ‘take all appropriate measures’ to prevent harm, or to 
minimize the risk thereof, cannot be confined to activities which are already 
properly appreciated as involving such a risk. The obligation extends to taking 
appropriate measures to identify activities which involve such a risk, and this 
obligation is of a continuing character.
Principle 13 restates a similar duty in relation to economic, social, and 
cultural rights.
(3) A meaningful assessment allows persons affected by state conduct an op-
portunity to be consulted, either directly or through representatives. Principle 14 
explicitly points to public participation as an indispensable element of an impact 
assessment. Principle 14 also underscores that the results of the assessment must 
be made public. This requirement gives effect to the right of access to informa-
tion, which has been recognized by the Human Rights Committee,82 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights,83 and the European Court of Human Rights.84
(4) Public access to the results of prior assessments is a guarantee of transpar-
ency. It also allows for state officials, as well as particularly affected persons, 
 82. General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, U.N. GAOR, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., 102d Sess., ¶¶ 18–19. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011).
 83. Reyes et al., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77.
 84. Társáság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Appl. No. 37374/05, ¶ 26, 35 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.brandenburg.de/media/lbm1.a.2628.de/EGMR_37374_05.pdf.
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to take measures to prevent or mitigate the impacts on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Principle 14 articulates this role of impact assessments, 
linking the measures states must adopt to prevent violations or ensure their 
cessation to the content of their impact assessments. The greater the potential 
risk to human rights, the more preventative measures should be taken. In 
its Commentary to Article 3 of the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, which it adopted in 2001, the ILC 
clarifies the preventative dimension of Principle 14 in the following terms: 
The required degree of care is proportional to the degree of hazard 
involved. The degree of harm itself should be foreseeable and the state 
must know or should have known that the given activity has the risk of 
significant harm. The higher the degree of inadmissible harm, the greater 
would be the duty of care required to prevent it.
This is transposable to the duty cited in Principle 14. The same Commentary 
lists the types of preventative measures states may undertake, including the 
following: “The modalities whereby the state of origin may discharge the 
obligations of prevention which have been established include, for example, 
legislative, administrative or other action necessary for enforcing the laws, 
administrative decisions and policies which the state of origin has adopted.”
(5) Principle 14 specifies the content of the prior assessment in relation 
to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. The implemen-
tation of Principle 14 may build on the experience gained from human 
rights impact assessments developed in various areas, such as the Human 
Rights Compliance Assessment launched by the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, the Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management 
by the International Business Leaders Forum, and the work of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.85 In regards to 
the negotiation and conclusion of trade and investment agreements, the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food presented guiding principles for a 
methodology of human rights impact assessments.86 
 85. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Hu-
man Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises, Mr. John Ruggie, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 14th Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 
60, A/HRC/17/31 (2010).
 86. Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schut-
ter, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n. on Hum. Rts., 19th Sess., Agenda Item 3, add., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (2011).
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(6) The requirement of a prior environmental assessment is enshrined in a 
large number of international agreements, such as the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In the Case concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay, the International Court of Justice recognized 
the importance of impact assessments in the environmental arena concern-
ing transboundary issues relating to international watercourse. The Court 
observed that the practice of environmental impact assessment,
has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be con-
sidered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transbound-
ary context, in particular, on a shared resource.87 
(7) Principle 14 clarifies that prior assessments must inform states of measures 
they must adopt to ensure effective remedies in accordance with Principle 
37 below. The disclosure of the results of human rights impact assessments 
should facilitate the possibility for victims of violations of economic, social, 
and cultural rights to avail themselves of existing remedies. 
15. Obligations of States as members of international organizations.
As a member of an international organization, the State remains responsible 
for its own conduct in relation to its human rights obligations within its terri-
tory and extraterritorially. A State that transfers competences to, or participates 
in, an international organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
the relevant organization acts consistently with the international human rights 
obligations of that State.
Commentary
(1) The first sentence of Principle 15 provides that, as a member of the 
international organization, a state must take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that, in its decision-making processes, the international organization acts 
in accordance with the pre-existing human rights obligations of the state 
concerned. In addressing the impact of structural adjustment programs on 
the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took the view in 1990 that, 
States parties to the Covenant, as well as the relevant United Nations agencies, 
should [. . .] make a particular effort to ensure that [the protection of the most 
basic economic, social and cultural rights] is, to the maximum extent possible, 
built-in to programmes and policies designed to promote adjustment.88 
 87. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J.,¶ 204.
 88. General Comment No. 2: International Technical Assistance Measures, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 4th Sess. ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.E/1990/23 (1990) (emphasis 
added).
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The implication is that states parties to the Covenant have obligations, as 
member states of the international financial institutions in general, and in 
this example, of the International Monetary Fund in particular, insofar as 
such institutions impose on indebted states certain austerity programs as a 
condition for access to the international financial markets. In the General 
Comment on the right to the highest attainable standard of health adopted 
in 2000,89 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights uses an 
even stronger formulation, moving from the affirmation of an obligation of 
means to an obligation of result. It notes that:
States parties have an obligation to ensure that their actions as members of 
international organizations take due account of the right to health. Accordingly, 
States parties which are members of international financial institutions, notably 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional development 
banks, should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to health in 
influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and international measures 
of these institutions.90 
A very similar formulation appears in the Committee’s General Comment 
on the right to water.91
(2) The second sentence of Principle 15 is concerned not with the life of the 
international organization once it has been set up, but with the establish-
ment of the international organization, and with the transfer by the state of 
certain powers to the organization. Each state has a duty to ensure that the 
international organization which the state establishes or of which it becomes 
a member complies with the pre-existing human rights obligations of that 
state in the exercise of the powers that organization has been delegated. 
For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has noted that while the 
European Convention on Human Rights “does not exclude the transfer of 
competences to international organizations,” this is “provided that Conven-
tion rights continue to be ‘secured.’ Member States’ responsibility therefore 
continues even after such a transfer.”92 
 89. General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cult. Rts., 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, ¶ 39 
(2000). (“In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, States parties 
should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact upon the 
right to health.”)
 90. Id. (emphasis added).
 91. See General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cult. Rts., 29th Sess., ¶ 36, E/C.12/2002/11 (2003).
States parties should ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take due 
account of the right to water. Accordingly, States parties that are members of international financial 
institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional development 
banks, should take steps to ensure that the right to water is taken into account in their lending 
policies, credit agreements and other international measures.
 92. Matthews v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 24833/94, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R., § 32 (18 Feb.); 
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S¸irketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 
42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 at § 154 (2005), Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 
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(3) This rule follows from the prohibition on entering into treaties that are 
incompatible with pre-existing treaty obligations in violation of the obliga-
tory nature of treaties, pacta sunt servanda.93 This is well established in 
international human rights law.94 According to the Draft Articles on Respon-
sibility of International Organizations, adopted on the second reading by 
the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, on 3 June 2011: 
A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibil-
ity if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in 
relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s international obligations, it 
circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, 
if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation.95 
It is therefore incumbent on a state establishing an international organiza-
tion or joining an international organization that it ensures that the powers 
delegated to that organization shall not be exercised in ways that may result 
in a violation of the human rights that the state has committed to uphold. 
The measures the state may take to avoid such a consequence may include: 
retaining a veto power over some of the decisions of the organization that 
may have such an impact; making certain that the decision-making pro-
cedure within the organization ensures that no measure is adopted by the 
organization that may result in a violation of human rights; and ensuring 
those affected by the measures adopted by the organization will have access 
to a court empowered to adjudicate human rights claims. 
16. Obligations of international organizations.
The present Principles apply to States without excluding their applicability to 
the human rights obligations of international organizations under, inter alia, 
general international law and international agreements to which they are parties.
 93. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, arts. 26, 30 § 4(b).
 94. General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ 19, 36 (“States parties should, in interna-
tional agreements whenever relevant, ensure that the right to adequate food is given 
due attention.”); General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 39 (“In relation to the 
conclusion of other international agreements, States parties should take steps to ensure 
that these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right to health.”); General 
Comment No. 15, supra note 91, ¶ ¶ 31, 35–36:
States parties should ensure that the right to water is given due attention in international agreements 
and, to that end, should consider the development of further legal instruments. With regard to 
the conclusion and implementation of other international and regional agreements, States parties 
should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right to water. 
Agreements concerning trade liberalization should not curtail or inhibit a country’s capacity to 
ensure the full realization of the right to water.
 95. Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted by Drafting Committee in 2011, 
U.N. GAOR, Int. Law Comm’n, 63d Sess., art. 61 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.778 (2011). 
This obligation, the article continues, applies whether or not the act in question is in-
ternationally wrongful for the international organization.
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Commentary
(1) As subjects of international law, international organizations are “bound 
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which 
they are parties.”96 Such obligations may include obligations in the area of 
human rights. Although stipulated in multilateral treaties that are binding 
on the states parties, a wide range of human rights has acquired a custom-
ary status in international law, and international organizations are therefore 
bound to exercise the powers they have been delegated in compliance with 
the requirements that they impose.97 Human rights may also be considered to 
form part of the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” 
within the meaning of Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice.98 The constitutions of several international organizations include 
human rights obligations, in particular the UN. Thus, the UN, including its 
specialized agencies, is necessarily bound by the human rights obligations 
contained in Articles 1 (3) and 55 of the UN Charter.99
(2) Principle 16 refers to the human rights obligations of international organi-
zations as stipulated in international agreements to which such organizations 
are parties. Some treaties provide for the accession, either of a specified 
international organization such as the European Union100 or of international 
organizations generally.101 
 96. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 Mar. 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, ¶37 (20 Dec.).
 97. See lOuis Henkin, tHe age Of RigHts 19 (1990); Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 int’l & cOmP. l. Q. 
321, 333 (1989); tHeODOR meROn, Human RigHts anD HumanitaRian nORms as custOmaRy law 
(1989); Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 texas int’l l. J. 129, 
132–34 (1977); Hannum, supra note 15, at 351. 
 98. Simma & Alston, supra note 15, at 102–08; Hannum, supra note 15, at 351–52; meROn, 
supra note 97, at 88. 
 99. Mac Darrow & Louise Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development 
Operations of the United Nations, 103 am. J. int’l l. 446, 471–72 (2009); mac DaRROw, 
Between ligHt anD sHaDOw: tHe wORlD Bank, tHe inteRnatiOnal mOnetaRy funD anD inteRnatiOnal 
Human RigHts law 124–29 (2003).
100. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, opened for signature 4 Apr. 1997, Council of Europe, Eur. T. S., No. 164, 
art. 33 (entered into force 1 Dec. 1999); Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature 28 Jan. 1981, 
Council of Europe, Eur. T. S., No. 108 (entered into force 1 Oct. 1982); see Additional 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature 8 Nov. 2001, Council of Europe, Eur. 
T. S., No. 181, art. 3(2)(entered into force 1 July 2004).
101. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 4, art. 44, provides for 
the signature and expression of consent to be bound by regional integration organiza-
tions. The European Union has now become a party to the Convention.
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(3) Although international organizations have no territory and generally do 
not exercise “jurisdiction” by enforcing their own decisions, these Principles 
may be applicable to their activities. For instance, in the context of peace-
keeping operations decided under chapter VII of the UN Charter, whether 
or not such operations lead to the establishment of a civilian administration 
under the responsibility of the United Nations is taken into consideration.102 
While these Principles primarily address states whose “jurisdiction” is seen 
as primarily territorial, their applicability to international organizations, 
mutatis mutandis, cannot be excluded. 
17. International agreements.
States must elaborate, interpret and apply relevant international agreements 
and standards in a manner consistent with their human rights obligations. Such 
obligations include those pertaining to international trade, investment, finance, 
taxation, environmental protection, development cooperation, and security.
Commentary
(1) Principle 17 addresses the obligation incumbent upon states to observe 
their international human rights obligations in respect to other areas of 
policy-making and international relations. Thus, it reflects the requirement 
that any agreements reached by a state are consistent with the state’s pre-
existing international human rights obligations, in order to reduce the risks 
associated with the fragmentation of international law and the emergence of 
conflicting obligations, and in order to ensure the primacy of human rights.103 
(2) Principle 17 finds support in various pronouncements linking human 
rights and other areas of international concern. The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights has noted that the enforcement of bilateral investment or 
commercial treaties should always be compatible with the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights.104 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has 
affirmed the principle that states cannot contract out of their human rights 
obligations.105 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
urged that human rights principles and obligations be fully integrated into 
102. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (10 June 
1999). 
103. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, U.N. GAOR, Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., ¶ 41, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (2006).
104. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C), Report No. 146, ¶ 140 (29 Mar. 2006). 
105. Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶154. 
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trade negotiations.106 The UN Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights has asserted the centrality and primacy of human rights 
obligations in all areas, including international trade and investment.107 The 
special rapporteurs of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights on globaliza-
tion and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights noted that, “[the] 
primacy of human rights law over all other regimes of international law is 
a basic and fundamental principle that should not be departed from.”108 
(3) Principle 17 places emphasis on the elaboration, interpretation, and 
application of relevant international agreements and standards. Elaboration 
includes the negotiation process, which should be informed by human 
rights considerations.109 Interpretation includes the various instances where 
the meaning of the terms in agreements is ascertained, and influence over 
their interpretation is exercised, including in dispute settlement. Application 
includes the adoption of specific measures, giving effect to the content of 
the relevant agreement. Principle 17 recalls that human rights obligations 
are intended to be respected in all situations by all UN member states, 
even in situations where they cooperate in other regimes than the interna-
tional human rights regime. As recalled by the European Court of Human 
Rights, this obligation is imposed under the UN Charter, and it extends, for 
instance, to the measures adopted by the UN Security Council in the name 
of international peace and security. 
As well as the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, set out 
in the first subparagraph of article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the third 
subparagraph provides that the United Nations was established to “achieve inter-
national cooperation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”. Article 24(2) of the Charter requires the Security 
Council, in discharging its duties with respect to its primary responsibility for 
106. See, e.g., Statement of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to 
the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Seattle, 30 November 
to 3 December 1999), U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 21st Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/9 (1999); General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ ¶ 19, 
36 (“States parties should, in international agreements whenever relevant, ensure that 
the right to adequate food is given due attention.”); General Comment No. 14, supra 
note 85, ¶ 39 (“In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, States 
parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact upon 
the right to health.”); General Comment No. 15, supra note 91, ¶ ¶ 31, 35–36.
107. Human Rights as the Primary Objective of Trade, Investment and Financial Policy, 
adopted 20 August 1998, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on the 
Prev. of Discrim & Protect. of Min., 50th Sess, 27th mtg., at 39 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1998/45 (1998).
108. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its Impact 
on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 52d 
Sess., ¶ 63 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000).
109. Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements, supra note 86.
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the maintenance of international peace and security, to “act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Against this background, the 
Court considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption 
that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member 
States to breach fundamental principles of human rights.110 
(4) Principle 17 uses the terms “international agreements and standards” 
to include not only international treaties as understood under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, but also those standards derived from 
other standard-setting processes. For example, the standards of the Codex 
Alimentarius are recognized under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytos-
anitary Measures of the World Trade Organization, but exist independently 
from that agreement.
(5) Principle 17 speaks of “relevant” international agreements and standards. 
This term is intended to denote that certain areas of international policy-
making have the potential to affect the realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights more decisively than other areas. For greater clarity, Principle 
17 includes an illustrative list of fields that are known to implicate these rights.
18. Belligerent occupation and effective control.
A State in belligerent occupation or that otherwise exercises effective control 
over territory outside its national territory must respect, protect and fulfil the 
economic, social and cultural rights of persons within that territory. A State ex-
ercising effective control over persons outside its national territory must respect, 
protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights of those persons.
Commentary
(1) Principle 18 concerns a special situation involving extraterritorial obliga-
tions whereby the state acting through its organs, outside its national territory, 
assumes special responsibilities with respect to its extraterritorial conduct. 
Indeed, where the state exercises belligerent occupation, its obligations are 
substantially similar to those it assumes with regard to situations or persons 
in its national territory.
(2) This general principle regarding the obligations of an occupying power 
was encapsulated in international treaty law in 1907, with its inclusion in 
the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907. Article 43 of the 
Regulations provides that an occupying power “shall take all the measures 
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
110. Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102 (2011).
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safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country.” In the case of, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(DRC v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice relied on this provision 
and stated that:
[T]his obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules 
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law to protect 
the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence and not to tol-
erate such violence by any third party. [. . .] The Court, having concluded that 
Uganda was an occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Uganda’s 
responsibility is engaged both for [i] any acts of its military that violated its in-
ternational obligations and for [ii] any lack of vigilance in preventing violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in 
the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account. [. . 
.] The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and 
omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its 
obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law which are relevant and applicable in the specific situation.111
(3) The application of the standard poses few difficulties in cases of complete 
occupation, such as in respect to Israel vis-à-vis the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. Thus, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
its Concluding Observations on the Periodic Report of Israel noted “the State 
Party’s obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and popula-
tions under its effective control.”112 The International Court of Justice, in the 
Advisory Opinion it adopted on the Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, stated that the occupied 
Palestinian territory is subject to Israel’s “territorial jurisdiction as the oc-
cupying Power. In the exercise of the powers available to it on this basis, 
Israel is bound by the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.”113
(4) In other situations, where one state controls a portion of the territory of 
another state, but where such control does not amount to complete control 
as in the case of an occupation, specific questions may arise. The European 
Court of Human Rights has made it clear that the duty to comply with hu-
man rights derives from the control that the state exercises, in fact, on the 
territory of another state:
111. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005, I.C.J. 26, ¶ 178–80.
112. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cult. Rts., 30th Sess., ¶¶ 15, 31, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (2003). 
113. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 112 (9 July).
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[An] exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 [of the European 
Convention on Human Rights] is limited to a State’s own territory occurs when, 
as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State ex-
ercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The obligation 
to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, 
derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through the 
Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a subordinate local administra-
tion. [. . .] Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it 
is not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed 
control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration. The 
fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting State’s 
military and other support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and 
actions. The controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, 
within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out 
in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will 
be liable for any violations of those rights. [. . .] It is a question of fact whether 
a Contracting State exercises effective control over an area outside its own ter-
ritory. In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily 
have reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the area. [. . .] 
Other indicators may also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, 
economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provides 
it with influence and control over the region.114
Further explanations as to the scope of the duties that follow from one state’s 
effective control of a portion of the territory of another state are provided 
under the Commentary to Principle 9 (a) above.
III. ObLIGATIONS TO RESPECT
19. General obligation.
All States must take action, separately, and jointly through international coopera-
tion, to respect the economic, social and cultural rights of persons within their 
territories and extraterritorially, as set out in Principles 20 to 22.
Commentary
(1) Principle 19 lays out the general obligation of states to respect the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights of persons within and outside their national 
territory. This general obligation to respect economic, social, and cultural 
rights is elaborated in Principles 20 through 22, including as regards direct 
and indirect interference as well as sanctions and equivalent measures.
114. Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, ¶ ¶ 138–39 
(citations omitted).
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(2) The general obligation to respect is rooted in the three-pronged typology 
of international human rights obligations: respect, protect, and fulfill. In this 
sense, Principle 19 recalls the duty of the state to organize its governmental 
apparatus through which it discharges public authority in a way that does 
not interfere with the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Principle 19 recalls the duty to refrain from conduct that nullifies or impairs 
the enjoyment and exercise of these rights. It also comprises obligations 
to take action separately and jointly through international cooperation to 
establish institutional arrangements necessary to respect economic, social, 
and cultural rights.
(3) Principle 19 makes explicit what is imposed under Article 56 of the 
UN Charter. As already noted above,115 that provision stipulates that, “[a]ll 
Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in coopera-
tion with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55,” which includes “universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion,” as well as “higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; 
solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems, 
and international cultural and educational cooperation.”116 The Charter 
imposes no territorial restriction on the obligations of UN member states. 
Instead, the reference to cooperation with the Organization suggests that, 
under the Charter, the realization of human rights is a duty that states owe 
to one another and that such duties extend beyond the individuals situated 
within their territories. 
(4) The basic requirement that states have human rights obligations that extend 
beyond their national territory has been given particularly clear recogni-
tion in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights. The Commentary 
to Principle 3, above, refers to other instruments of international human 
rights law that set out duties of international assistance and cooperation. 
The importance of international cooperation is also stressed in Article 4 
(“Cooperation”) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, which pro-
vides that: “States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as necessary, 
seek the assistance of one or more competent international organizations 
in preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing 
the risk thereof.”
115. See Commentary, Princ. 3. 
116. U.N. Charter, supra note 13, arts. 56–55.
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(5) In Principle 19, and subsequently in the present Principles, references 
to “persons” include individuals as well as groups. As noted in Guideline 
20 of the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: 
As is the case with civil and political rights, both individuals and groups can be 
victims of violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. Certain groups suf-
fer disproportionate harm in this respect such as lower-income groups, women, 
indigenous and tribal peoples, occupied populations, asylum seekers, refugees 
and internally displaced persons, minorities, the elderly, children, landless peas-
ants, persons with disabilities and the homeless.
20. Direct interference.
All States have the obligation to refrain from conduct which nullifies or impairs 
the enjoyment and exercise of economic, social and cultural rights of persons 
outside their territories.
Commentary
(1) Principle 20 establishes the duty of the state to refrain from conduct that 
nullifies or impairs the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights 
outside that state’s national territory. In order to give effect to this obligation, 
a state confronted with a situation that could implicate risks to economic, 
social, and cultural rights is required to undertake positive measures to 
ensure its actions do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of these rights 
outside the national territory.
(2) Principle 20 distinguishes between direct and indirect interference. In-
direct interference is addressed in Principle 21. Direct interference, which 
Principle 20 addresses, refers to situations where the conduct of the state 
has a potential impact on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural 
rights without the involvement of any other state or international organiza-
tion being involved in the situation that leads to nullification or impairment 
of the enjoyment of these rights.
21. Indirect interference.
States must refrain from any conduct which: 
a) impairs the ability of another State or international organization to com-
ply with that State’s or that international organization’s obligations as regards 
economic, social and cultural rights; or
b) aids, assists, directs, controls or coerces another State or international 
organization to breach that State’s or that international organization’s obligations 
as regards economic, social and cultural rights, where the former States do so 
with knowledge of the circumstances of the act. 
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Commentary
(1) Principle 21 addresses situations where a state’s conduct impairs the ability 
of another state or international organization to discharge their international 
obligations. It also addresses situations where a state aids, assists, directs, 
controls, or coerces another state or international organization in breaching 
its international obligations regarding economic, social, and cultural rights. 
(2) The language replicates Articles 16 through 18 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts.117 Article 16 states: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internation-
ally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) 
that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed 
by that State. 
As noted by the International Law Commission, this general principle has 
been embodied in a number of specific substantive rules of international 
law, including the first principle of the Declaration on the Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the UN Charter118 and Article 3 (f) of the Defini-
tion of Aggression.119
(3) The International Law Commission elaborated on the meaning of Article 
16 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, stating in particular: 
Such situations arise where a State voluntarily assists or aids another State in 
carrying out conduct which violates the international obligations of the latter, 
for example, by knowingly providing an essential facility or financing the activ-
ity in question. Other examples include providing means for the closing of an 
international waterway, facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign soil, or 
assisting in the destruction of property belonging to nationals of a third country. 
[. . .] The requirement that the assisting State be aware of the circumstances 
making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful is reflected 
by the phrase “knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
117. Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 34, arts. 16–18. 
118. Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, adopted 
24 Oct. 1970, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8028/
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
119. Definition of Aggression, adopted 14 Dec. 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, (XXIX), 
29th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX)
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act.” A State providing material or financial assistance or aid to another State 
does not normally assume the risk that its assistance or aid may be used to carry 
out an internationally wrongful act. If the assisting or aiding State is unaware of 
the circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the 
other State, it bears no international responsibility.
(4) Article 17 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts states: 
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an inter-
nationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for that act if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed 
by that State. 
The International Law Commission notes that Article 17
is limited to cases where a dominant State actually directs and controls conduct 
which is a breach of an international obligation of the dependent State. Inter-
national tribunals have consistently refused to infer responsibility on the part 
of a dominant State merely because the latter may have the power to interfere 
in matters of administration internal to a dependent State, if that power is not 
exercised in the particular case.
(5) The Commentary to Article 17 of the Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts also explains the difference between the 
language in Articles 16 and 17: 
Under Article 16, a State providing aid or assistance with a view to the commis-
sion of an internationally wrongful act incurs international responsibility only 
to the extent of the aid or assistance given. By contrast, a State which directs 
and controls another in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is 
responsible for the act itself, since it controlled and directed the act in its entirety.
(6) Article 18 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts states: 
A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally respon-
sible for that act if: (a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an internation-
ally wrongful act of the coerced State; and (b) the coercing State does so with 
knowledge of the circumstances of the act.
The Commentary of the International Law Commission describes coercion 
in this manner:
Coercion for the purpose of Article 18 has the same essential character as force 
majeure [referred to in Article 23 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts]. Nothing less than conduct which forces the will 
of the coerced State will suffice, giving it no effective choice but to comply 
with the wishes of the coercing State. It is not sufficient that compliance with 
the obligation is made more difficult or onerous.
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(7) Principle 21 also reflects the concepts of abetting and negligent assistance 
to the state in violation of its obligations to comply with economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Such acts fall short of coercion. They do not necessarily 
cause another state or international organization to breach their obligations 
in regards to economic, social, and cultural rights. As the Commentary on 
Article 16 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts notes: “There is no requirement that the aid or assistance should 
have been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act; 
it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”
22. Sanctions and equivalent measures.
States must refrain from adopting measures, such as embargoes or other eco-
nomic sanctions, which would result in nullifying or impairing the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights. Where sanctions are undertaken to fulfil 
other international legal obligations, States must ensure that human rights obliga-
tions are fully respected in the design, implementation and termination of any 
sanctions regime. States must refrain in all circumstances from embargoes and 
equivalent measures on goods and services essential to meet core obligations.
Commentary
(1) Principle 22 may be seen as elaborating on Principles 19 through 21 
as they apply to sanctions, embargoes, and analogous measures that could 
have the effect of restricting the enjoyment of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights. The broad term “measures” is used to refer to a wide range of 
actions that could include, for example, military blockades, prohibitions on 
trade with another state, sanctions for non-compliance with World Trade 
Organization rulings, or removal of trade preferential schemes. It also covers 
threats, pressures, or inducements of such actions. Principle 22 addresses 
situations where there would be a significant negative impact on the ability 
of a group of people to realize their economic, social, and cultural rights. 
An example of such a situation would be where sanctions on a particular 
industry lead to low-paid workers being laid off and there is inadequate 
provision for their social security. Principle 22 does not apply to sanctions 
that simply reduce the income of producers or government officials without 
impairing their ability to secure their economic, social, and cultural rights.
(2) Principle 22 should be understood to be consistent with Article 50 of 
the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which stipulates that counter-measures by a 
state or group of states in response to an internationally wrongful act by 
another state may not affect obligations for the protection of fundamental 
human rights.
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(3) The second sentence of Principle 22 relates to a specific case where a 
state is required to impose sanctions in order to fulfill its other legal ob-
ligations, such as compliance with a sanctions regime established by the 
UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or when 
sanctions are required in order to fulfill a state’s obligation to bring to an 
end violations of peremptory norms of international law. Article 103 of the 
UN Charter provides that states’ obligations under the UN Charter prevail 
over states’ obligations under any other international agreements. However, 
this cannot be interpreted to mean that the UN Security Council can adopt 
measures that set aside human rights obligations. As noted by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, even when the Security Council 
is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, “those provisions of the Charter 
that relate to human rights (Articles 1, 55 and 56) must still be considered 
to be fully applicable in such cases.”120 
(4) Principle 22 does not take a position as to whether it is permissible for a 
state or group of states to impose sanctions nullifying or impairing economic, 
social, and cultural rights where the objective is to ensure that the targeted 
state complies with its own international legal obligations. Any such sanctions 
would need to be consistent with the limitations provisions relating to the 
specific rights affected, in particular, Article 4 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
(5) Where sanctions are permissible, Principle 22 indicates states have dis-
tinct obligations at each of the three stages of design, implementation, and 
termination of sanctions. First, as stated by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, economic, social, and cultural rights “must be 
taken fully into account when designing an appropriate sanctions regime.”121 
Sanctions must be in proportion to the objectives of ensuring compliance 
with international obligations while the negative impacts of the sanctions 
on human rights should be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Com-
mon Article 1 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights indicates an unconditional limitation on sanctions derived from the 
right to self-determination: “In no case may a people be deprived of its own 
means of subsistence.” Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights indicates that any limitation must be “compatible 
with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”
120. See General Comment No. 8, supra note 36, ¶ 1.
121. Id. ¶ 12.
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(6) Second, the implementation of sanctions should be consistent with human 
rights obligations. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has stated that effective monitoring should be undertaken throughout the 
period sanctions are in force. The external entity imposing sanctions has “an 
obligation ‘to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ in order to respond 
to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within 
the targeted country.”122 
(7) Third, human rights obligations should be taken into account in deter-
mining when sanctions must be terminated. Sanctions must therefore be 
ended if the impact on economic, social, and cultural rights outweighs the 
objectives being sought. 
(8) The last sentence of Principle 22 sets out an unconditional limitation on 
sanctions, stipulating that they may not restrict the provision of goods and 
services essential to meeting core obligations. The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has stated in its General Comments on the rights 
to water, food, and health that states should refrain at all times from impos-
ing embargoes or similar measures that prevent the supply of water, food, 
and health care, as well as goods and services essential for securing these 
rights; denial of access to such rights should never be used as an instrument 
of political and economic pressure.123 Such obligations almost certainly 
apply to other economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the rights to 
sanitation and to education. 
VI. ObLIGATIONS TO PROTECT
23. General obligation.
All States must take action, separately, and jointly through international coop-
eration, to protect economic, social and cultural rights of persons within their 
territories and extraterritorially, as set out in Principles 24 to 27.
122. Id. ¶ 14; Working Paper on the Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the 
Enjoyment of Human Rights, presented by Marc Bossuyt, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on 
Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Hum. Rts., 52nd Sess., Agenda 
Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000).
123. General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ 37; General Comment No. 14, supra note 
89, ¶ 41; General Comment No. 15, supra note 91, ¶ 32.
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Commentary
(1) Principle 23 states the general obligation to protect economic, social, 
and cultural rights extraterritorially. The general obligation to protect is de-
veloped in Principles 24 to 27, including through regulation where this is 
in compliance with general international law.
(2) The general obligation to protect is rooted in a three-pronged typology 
of international human rights obligations: respect, protect, and fulfill. Thus, 
Principle 23 recalls the duty of the state to take practicable measures to 
protect economic, social, and cultural rights against the risk of interference 
by private actors. Principle 23 imposes on the state a positive duty to take 
steps to protect economic, social, and cultural rights from interference. 
Principle 23 also contemplates the duty to take action separately and jointly 
through international cooperation.
24. Obligation to regulate.
All States must take necessary measures to ensure that non-State actors which 
they are in a position to regulate, as set out in Principle 25, such as private 
individuals and organizations, and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, social and cul-
tural rights. These include administrative, legislative, investigative, adjudicatory 
and other measures. All other States have a duty to refrain from nullifying or 
impairing the discharge of this obligation to protect.
Commentary
(1) The duty to regulate the conduct of private groups or individuals, including 
legal persons, in order to ensure that such conduct shall not result in violating 
the human rights of others is well established in international human rights 
law.124 Outside exceptional circumstances, only the conduct of the state’s 
organs may be attributed to the state and thus engage its responsibility;125 
however, such conduct includes the failure of the state to adopt regulations 
or to implement them effectively where such a failure is in contravention of 
the human rights undertakings of the state. The principle has been affirmed 
by a large number of decisions of human rights bodies, whether judicial or 
124. De Schutter, The Status of Human Rights in International Law, supra note 14.
125. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64, ¶ 108. 
See generally Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 34, arts. 16–18; Commentary, 
Princ. 12.
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quasi-judicial, operating under both universal and regional instruments.126 
(2) The duty of the state to protect human rights by regulating the conduct 
of private actors extends to situations where such conduct may lead to vio-
lations of human rights in the territory of another state. International law 
imposes a prohibition on the state to allow the use of its territory to cause 
environmental damage in the territory of another state,127 but the obligation 
126. Only a small sample can be referred to here. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 
50, ¶ 8:
[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged 
if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, 
but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities.
   See also General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ 15 (“The obligation to protect 
requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive 
individuals of their access to adequate food”); Young and Webster v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 7601/76; 7806/77, 1981 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (ser. A) No. 44, ¶ 49; X and Y v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (ser. A) No. 91, 27 (1985); under 
the Eur. Consult. Ass., Marangopoulos Found. for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, Eur. 
Comm. of Social Rights, Doc. No. 1 (4 April 2005):
[T]he state is responsible for enforcing the rights embodied in the Charter within its jurisdiction. 
The Committee is therefore competent to consider the complainant’s allegations of violations, 
even if the State has not acted as an operator but has simply failed to put an end to the alleged 
violations in its capacity as regulator.
   American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, arts. 1–2, O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered 
into force 18 July 1978). See also Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (29 July 1988). :
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State 
(for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not 
been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, 
but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required 
by the Convention.
   Commission nationale des droits de l’Homme et des libertés v. Chad, App. No. 74/92, 
Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9th Annual Activity Report, ¶¶ 18–22 
(1995–1996) (“The Charter specifies in Article 1 that the States parties shall not only 
recognise the rights, duties and freedoms adopted by the Charter, but they should also 
‘undertake . . . measures to give effect to them’. In other words, if a State neglects to 
ensure the rights in the African Charter, this may constitute a violation, even if the State or 
its agents are not the immediate cause of the violation”), or Soc. and Econ. Rights Action 
Ctr. and Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria (Merits), App. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 15th Annual Activity Report, 30th Sess., ¶ 46 (27 Oct. 2001):
[T]he State is obliged to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision 
of effective remedies. This obligation requires the State to take measures to protect beneficiaries 
of the protected rights against political, economic and social interferences. Protection generally 
entails the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay 
of laws and regulations so that individuals will be able to freely realise their rights and freedoms
   These principles apply equally in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights: 
Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-State Actors 
through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the “Obligation 
to Protect,” 9 Hum. Rts. l. Rev. 225 (2009).
127. See Commentary, Princ. 20.
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not to allow the national territory to be used to cause damage in another 
state is of a general nature: it is not limited to cases of transboundary pol-
lution. In the Corfu Channel Case, while accepting that an activity cannot 
be imputed to the state by reason merely of the fact that it took place on its 
territory, the International Court of Justice nevertheless noted that “a State 
on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary to international law 
has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation” where the state 
knew or should have known that activities unlawful under international law 
(i.e., activities that would violate international law if they were imputed to 
the state in question) were perpetrated on its territory and caused damage 
to another state, then the first state is expected to take measures to prevent 
them from taking place or, if they are taking place, from continuing.128 It 
has been remarked on this basis that “the state is under a duty to control 
the activities of private persons within its state territory and the duty is no 
less applicable where the harm is caused to persons or other legal interests 
within the territory of another state.”129 
(3) The general obligation to exercise influence on the conduct of non-state 
actors where such conduct might lead to human rights being violated outside 
the state’s national territory has been emphasized by various UN human 
rights treaty bodies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
particularly affirms that states parties should, 
prevent third parties from violating the right[s protected under the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] in other 
countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of 
128. The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22, at 18. The fact of territorial control also 
influences the burden of proof imposed on the claiming state that the territorial state 
has failed to comply with its obligations under international law. Although “it cannot 
be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory 
and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful 
act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the 
authors,” nevertheless 
the fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing 
upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. 
By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a breach of international law, is 
often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be 
allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect 
evidence is admitted in al1 systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. 
It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and 
leading logically to a single conclusion.
129. ian BROwnlie, system Of tHe law Of natiOns: state ResPOnsiBility (Part 1) 165 (1983); See also 
nicOla m.c.P. JägeRs, cORPORate Human RigHts OBligatiOns: in seaRcH Of accOuntaBility 172 
(2002) (deriving from “the general principle formulated in the Corfu Channel case—that 
a State has the obligation not knowingly to allow its territory to be used for acts contrary 
to the rights of other States—that home State responsibility can arise where the home 
State has not exercised due diligence in controlling parent companies that are effectively 
under its control”). 
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legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and applicable international law.130 
Specifically, in regard to corporations the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has further stated that: “States Parties should also take 
steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations that 
have their main seat under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sover-
eignty or diminishing the obligations of host states under the Covenant.”131 
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
called upon states to regulate the extraterritorial actions of third parties 
registered in their territory. For example, in 2007, it called upon Canada 
to “take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to prevent acts 
of transnational corporations registered in Canada which negatively impact 
on the enjoyment of rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside 
Canada,” recommending in particular that the state party “explore ways to 
hold transnational corporations registered in Canada accountable.”132 This 
latter requirement, to provide access to remedies for victims of malfeasance 
by non-state actors operating from one state into another where the host 
state is unable or unwilling to provide such access is detailed further under 
Section VI of the Principles, which addresses accountability and remedies.
25. Bases for protection.
States must adopt and enforce measures to protect economic, social and cultural 
rights through legal and other means, including diplomatic means, in each of 
the following circumstances:
a) the harm or threat of harm originates or occurs on its territory; 
b) where the non-State actor has the nationality of the State concerned; 
 c) as regards business enterprises, where the corporation, or its parent or 
controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, 
or has its main place of business or substantial business activities, in the 
State concerned; 
 d) where there is a reasonable link between the State concerned and the 
conduct it seeks to regulate, including where relevant aspects of a non-state 
actor’s activities are carried out in that State’s territory; 
 e) where any conduct impairing economic, social and cultural rights con-
stitutes a violation of a peremptory norm of international law. Where such 
130. General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 39; see also General Comment No. 15, 
supra note 91, ¶ 31.
131. Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., ¶ 
5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (2011).
132. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: 
Concluding Observations, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Elim. of Racial Discrim., 70th 
Sess., ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007).
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a violation also constitutes a crime under international law, States must 
exercise universal jurisdiction over those bearing responsibility or lawfully 
transfer them to an appropriate jurisdiction.
Commentary
(1) Principle 25 recalls the classic bases for allowing a state, in compliance 
with international law, to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction by seeking to 
regulate conduct that takes place outside its territory.133 
(2) Some authors argue that as long as states stop short of sending their 
agents or organs abroad, exercising what is sometimes referred to as “en-
forcement jurisdiction,” they are free to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by adopting legislation that seeks to regulate behavior in other states and 
by allowing their courts to adjudicate cases related to such behavior.134 That 
was the position adopted by judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in her dissent-
ing opinion to the International Court of Justice case concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium).135 
Indeed, in the 1927 Lotus Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
had expressed the view in dicta that states were, in principle, free to regu-
late matters situated outside their national territory unless specific rules of 
international law prohibited such exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.136 
However, that extreme view, based on an understanding of international law 
regarding jurisdiction that is indebted to an era when the sovereignty of the 
state was at its apex, is not the one espoused here. Instead, Principle 25 
reflects that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction should facilitate the 
coexistence between states and their cooperation in addressing situations 
that are of concern to more than one or (as regards peremptory norms of 
133. See Olivier De Schutter, Sovereignty-plus in the Era of Interdependence: Towards an 
International Convention on Combating Human Rights Violations by Transnational 
Corporations, in making tRansnatiOnal law wORk in tHe glOBal ecOnOmy: essays in HOnOuR 
Of Detlev vagts 245 (Pieter H.F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer, & Michael Waibel eds., 2010).
134. PatRick DaillieR & alain Pellet, DROit inteRnatiOnal PuBlic 506 (7th ed. 2002).
135. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 19 (14 Feb.) (Van 
Den Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
136. The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (7 Sept.):
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application 
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, 
it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases 
by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which 
it regards as best and most suitable. 
   There is still disagreement within legal scholarship as to the validity of the premise put 
forward in the case of S.S. Lotus, according to which States are free to seek to regulate 
conduct outside their territory provided there is no specific prohibition under international 
law to do so: see Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction, in extRa-teRRitORial 
aPPlicatiOn Of laws anD ResPOnses tHeRetO 3 (Cecil J. Olmstead ed., 1984).
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international law or international crimes justifying the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction) to the international community as a whole. The Principle re-
states the relevant bases justifying extraterritorial (prescriptive) jurisdiction 
by a state, i.e., the adoption of regulations that seek to influence conduct 
that may result in the violation of the human rights of individuals situated 
on the territory of another state. 
(3) Principle 25 (a), (b), and (c) reflect the active personality principle as a 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. According to this principle, a state may 
regulate the conduct of its nationals abroad.137 Specific difficulties arise, 
however, with regard to the regulation of legal persons in the absence of 
any particular mode of determination of the nationality under international 
law and the risk of abuse this might entail. Principle 25 (c) therefore makes 
it clear that, based on the active personality principle, a state may regulate 
an enterprise that has its center of activity in the national territory, which 
is registered or domiciled on the territory, or which has its main place of 
business or substantial business activities in the territory. 
(4) In practice, transnational corporations operating in different states are 
typically organized in different legal entities, incorporated under the laws of 
different states, and linked by an investment nexus. Doubts have sometimes 
been expressed as to whether it should be considered allowable for states to 
try to regulate the conduct of legal persons incorporated under the laws of 
another country but which are managed, controlled, or owned, by natural 
or legal persons who have the same nationality as the state concerned. In 
the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice recalled that, 
in municipal law a distinction is made between the rights of the company 
and those of the shareholders, and that “the concept and structure of the 
company are founded on and determined by a firm distinction between the 
separate entity of the company and that of the shareholders, each with a 
distinct set of rights.”138 However, this ruling does not necessarily prohibit a 
state from treating a company incorporated in another state, but controlled 
by a parent company incorporated in the state seeking to exercise extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, as having the nationality of that state for the purposes 
of exercising such jurisdiction. Already in its Barcelona Traction judgment, 
the International Court of Justice noted the veil of the company may be 
lifted to prevent the misuse of the privileges of legal personality, both in 
137. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 
(2) (1987) (“a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (2) the activities, 
interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory”). 
138. Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) (second 
phase—merits), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 184 (5 Feb.). 
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municipal and international law.139 Therefore, where the separation of legal 
personalities is used as a device by the parent company to limit the scope 
of its legal liability, lifting of the veil may be justified. In addition, the re-
cent proliferation of bilateral investment treaties under which states seek 
to protect their nationals as investors in foreign countries, (even in cases 
where they have set up subsidiaries under the laws of the host country) 
sheds further doubt on the validity of the classical rule enunciated by the 
Barcelona Traction judgment, according to which a state may not claim a 
legal interest in the situation of foreign companies even when its nationals 
are in control.140 The 2004 Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), for 
instance, defines as an “investor of a Party” protected under such a treaty 
“a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, 
that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory 
of the other Party,” with “investment” meaning “every asset that an inves-
tor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of 
an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital 
or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of 
risk.” Under these definitions, investments made by US nationals in a state 
bound by a BIT concluded with the United States are protected under the 
treaty, even and particularly when their investment consists in participation 
involving a degree of direct or indirect control in a corporation incorporated 
in the host country. 
(5) The practice of determining the nationality of the corporation on the 
basis of the nationality of its shareholders, particularly of the nationality 
of a controlling parent company, while not usual, is not unheard of. For 
instance, while the practice of the US has generally been to determine the 
nationality of the corporation on the basis of the company’s place of incor-
poration,141 it is occasionally defined by reference to the nationality of its 
owners, managers, or other persons deemed to be in control of its affairs. For 
example, this is the case in the area of taxation. But there seems to be no 
reason why this could not also justify the exercise of foreign direct liability 
regulation in other domains. The Third Restatement on Foreign Relations 
Law of the American Law Institute therefore does not exclude the regula-
tion of foreign corporations, i.e., corporations organized under the laws of 
139. Id. 38–39.
140. Doubts were raised at an early stage concerning the relevance of the Barcelona Traction 
case beyond the exercise of diplomatic protection: see S. D. Metzger, Nationality of 
Corporate Investment Under Investment Guaranty Schemes: The Relevance of Barcelona 
Traction, 65 am. J. int’l l. 532, 532–43 (1971).
141. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra note 137, 
§ 213 note 5.
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a foreign state, “on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals 
of the regulating state.”142 
(6) Another approach to regulating the conduct of transnational corporations 
consists of a state imposing on parent corporations domiciled in that state an 
obligation to comply with certain norms wherever they operate (i.e., even 
if they operate in other countries), or an obligation to impose compliance 
with such norms on the different entities they control (their subsidiaries, or 
even in certain cases their business partners). Under this approach, some-
times referred to as “parent-based extraterritorial regulation,” no question of 
extraterritoriality arises: the parent corporation imposes certain obligations 
by the state of which it has its “nationality” (or where it is domiciled) and 
the impacts on situations located outside the national territory are merely 
indirect insofar as such impacts would result from the parent company being 
required to impose an obligation to control its subsidiaries or to monitor 
the supply chain. 
(7) Principle 25 (d) makes it clear that while a reasonable link must exist 
between the state and the situation it seeks to regulate, it would be artificial 
to restrict the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by prescribing certain 
conduct to a limited range of instances. However, it must be shown by the 
state in question that exercising such jurisdiction is not acting in violation 
of the UN Charter or other principles of international law: specifically, by 
intervening in the domestic affairs of the territorial state, interfering with its 
sovereign rights, or interfering with the principle of equality of all states. 
Examples of instances where a state should take action to protect rights 
under Principle 25 (d) that may not be addressed by (a), (b), and (c) include 
situations where a non-state actor accused of human rights abuse in another 
country has assets that can be seized in order to implement the judgment 
of a competent court where there may be relevant evidence or witnesses, 
where relevant officials accused of criminal liability may be present, or 
where the non-state actor may have carried out part of the operations that 
resulted in the abuse.
(8) The adoption by one state of a legislative instrument imposing human 
rights obligations on a private actor would violate the principles that have 
been enunciated only in exceptional cases. In the words of the International 
Court of Justice, the principle of non-intervention
forbids all States [. . .] to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external 
affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing 
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, 
142. Id. § 414.
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to decide freely. [. . .] Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion 
in regard to such choices, which mush remain free ones.143 
Nonetheless, it has long been acknowledged that internationally recognized 
human rights—such as those included in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights—impose limits on state sovereignty, and that such matters 
cannot be said to belong to the exclusive national jurisdiction of the territo-
rial state. Moreover, it is doubtful one may speak here of “coercion” in the 
meaning attached to it in international law. This is the case when one state 
regulates the conduct of transnational corporations, including where that 
conduct may violate human rights outside that state’s territory. In seeking 
to regulate the activities of foreign investors in the host states through the 
adoption of extraterritorial legislation, other states are not imposing on the 
norms of territorial state compliance or imposing compliance with these 
norms on the local corporations: without prejudice to its obligations under 
the international law of human rights, that state remains free to legislate 
upon activities in its national territory.144
(9) More generally, while the restrictions international law imposes on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction remain debated, the interpretation of existing 
rules should take into account the specific nature of state regulations that 
seek to impose compliance with human rights or that seek to contribute to 
multilaterally agreed goals such as the MDGs. The erga omnes character of 
human rights145 may justify allowing the exercise by states of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, even in conditions that might otherwise not be permissible, 
where such exercise seeks to promote such rights. Similarly, the realization 
of the MDGs is of interest to all states. Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction 
seeking to promote human rights, or the achievement of the MDGs, is not a 
case where one state seeks to impose its values on another state, as in other 
cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Principle 22 (c) reflects the fact that, 
in such a case, a more flexible understanding of the limits on prescriptive 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may be justified.
(10) Principle 25 (e) reflects that there is a category of crimes under interna-
tional law where states must contribute to combating violations by exercising 
universal jurisdiction, i.e., by allowing in their judicial jurisdictions the pros-
143. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64, at ¶ 
205.
144. Solutions may have to be found in exceptional situations where obligations imposed 
by the home State on foreign investors enter into conflict with those which would be 
imposed by other States, including the home states of the investors concerned. 
145. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. 1970 I.C.J. 3, at ¶ 33–34; Commentary 
to Princ. 2, ¶ 4.
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ecution of such crimes wherever they occurred and whatever the nationality of 
either the offender or the victim.146 Under the principle of universality, certain 
heinous crimes may be prosecuted by any state, acting in the name of the 
international community, where the crime meets with universal reprobation. 
It is on this basis that, since time immemorial, piracy could be combated by 
all states: the pirate was seen as the hostis humanis generis, the enemy of the 
human race, which all states are considered to have a right to prosecute and 
punish. The international crimes for which treaties impose the principle aut 
dedere, aut judicare, or that are recognized as international crimes—requiring 
that all states contribute to their prevention and repression by investigating 
and prosecuting such crimes where the author is found on their territory 
unless the suspected author is extradited—also require the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction.147 International crimes justifying the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction include war crimes,148 crimes against humanity,149 genocide,150 
146. See, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdic-
tion in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 940, 941–43 (2001) 
(“Under the principle of universal jurisdiction a State is entitled or even required to 
bring proceedings in respect of certain serious crimes, irrespective of the location of 
the crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”).
147. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 76 ¶ 46 (14 Feb.) ( Higgins, Kooimans, 
& Buergenthal, opinions).; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities, 89 am. J. int’l l. 554 (1995).
148. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered 
into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Geneva Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered 
into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 
1956); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 146, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 
Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956).
149. The jus cogens character of the prohibition of crimes against humanity is generally 
considered to imply an obligation to contribute to their universal repression: see M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention, 
31 cOlum. J. tRansnat’l l. 457, 480–81 (1994); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction 
Under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 829–30 (1988); Principles of International 
Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty 
of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, adopted 3 Dec. 1973, G.A. Res. 3074 
(XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
150. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 i.c.J. 15, at 23 (28 may) (noting that “the principles 
underlying the Convention [Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 260 A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, at 1021 (entered into 
force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989)] are principles which are 
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional 
obligation,” and that “both . . . the condemnation of genocide and . . . the co-operation 
required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the
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torture,151 and enforced disappearances.152 In prosecuting these crimes, states 
are not seen to act exclusively in their own interest; they act as agents of 
the international community. The same applies to violations of jus cogens 
norms (peremptory norms of international law), because these norms serve 
the interests of the international community and the compliance that all 
states have a legal interest in.
26. Position to influence.
States that are in a position to influence the conduct of non-State actors even if 
they are not in a position to regulate such conduct, such as through their public 
procurement system or international diplomacy, should exercise such influence, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and general international 
law, in order to protect economic, social, and cultural rights.
Commentary
Principle 26 reflects the fact that there are many ways in which a state may 
seek to influence the conduct of private actors other than by adopting regu-
lations that impose certain forms of conduct under the threat of sanctions, 
either civil, criminal, or administrative. In other words, the ability to influ-
ence conduct should not be limited to the ability to exercise extraterritorial 
and prescriptive jurisdiction. It may include various forms of reporting or 
social labeling, the use of indicators to monitor progress, the reliance on 
human rights-based conditions in public procurement schemes or export 
credit agencies, or fiscal incentives. The Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights include a number of recommendations in this regard.153
27. Obligation to cooperate.
All States must cooperate to ensure that non-State actors do not impair the 
enjoyment of the economic, social and cultural rights of any persons. This 
   Convention) have a ‘universal character,’” i.e., are obligations imposed on all states of 
the international community). On the erga omnes character of the obligations imposed 
by the Convention, implying that “the obligation each State . . . has to prevent and to 
punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention,” see the 
Judgment of 11 July 1996 delivered in the case concerning Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 i.c.J. 595, 615–16, ¶ 31 (11 July).
151. CAT, supra note 23, art. 5(2).
152. International Convention for the Protection of All Person from Enforced Disappearance, 
supra note 24, art. 9(2).
153. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. GAOR, Hu-
man Rights Council, 17th Sess., Agenda item 3, princs. 2, 3–10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(2011) (John Ruggie).
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obligation includes measures to prevent human rights abuses by non-State ac-
tors, to hold them to account for any such abuses, and to ensure an effective 
remedy for those affected.
Commentary
As made clear in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: “States 
should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial 
mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including 
considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that 
could lead to a denial of access to remedy.” Such legal barriers can include 
“where claimants face a denial of justice in a host state and cannot access 
home state courts regardless of the merits of the claim.”154 The implication 
is that, in transnational situations, states should cooperate in order to ensure 
that any victim of the activities of non-state actors that result in a violation of 
economic, social, or cultural rights has access to an effective remedy, prefer-
ably of a judicial nature, in order to seek redress. This requirement is related 
to the provision of effective remedies to victims of violations of economic, 
social, and cultural rights discussed further in Section VI.
V. ObLIGATIONS TO fULfIL.
28. General obligation.
All States must take action, separately, and jointly through international co-
operation, to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights of persons within their 
territories and extraterritorially, as set out in Principles 29 to 35.
Commentary
(1) Principle 28 recognizes states have a positive obligation to fulfill economic, 
social, and cultural rights beyond their respective territories. The formulation 
is closely aligned with Article 56 of the UN Charter, visited above.155 The 
duty to cooperate internationally in the realization of human rights is further 
reinforced by the obligations of international assistance and cooperation, 
explicitly for the purpose of realizing economic, social, and cultural rights 
provided by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights as well as under other instruments that relate to these rights.156 
154. See Princ. 26.
155. See Commentary, Princ. 3; Commentary, Princ. 19, ¶ 3.
156. See Commentary, Princ. 3, ¶¶ 6, 8.
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(2) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized 
that 
in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
with well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions of 
the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. 
[. . .] It emphasizes that, in the absence of an active programme of international 
assistance and cooperation on the part of all those States that are in a position 
to undertake one, the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights 
will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many countries.157 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated: “When States ratify the 
Convention, they take upon themselves obligations not only to implement it 
within their jurisdiction, but also to contribute, through international coopera-
tion, to global implementation.”158 The Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action is also premised on the idea that states are duty-bound to fulfill 
human rights and to contribute to their full realization, both within their 
national territory and on the territory of other states.159 The failure of another 
state or states to act jointly through international cooperation in fulfilling 
economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially does not relieve a state 
of its own international obligations, the breach of which may give rise to its 
international responsibility.
(3) While the duty to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights outside 
one state’s national territory shall, in principle, take the form of interstate 
cooperation, Principle 28 does not exclude that it may also take the form of 
other measures directly supporting the enjoyment of economic, social, and 
cultural rights of individuals found in another state’s territory. Consistent with 
Principle 10, however, the scope of this duty is limited by the obligation to 
respect the sovereignty of the territorially competent state. In addition, as 
further expressed in Principle 31, the duty of all states to contribute to the 
fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights in other states should not 
be interpreted as limiting the scope of the obligation of any state to discharge 
its obligations towards all individuals located on its territory.
29. Obligation to create an international enabling environment.
States must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps, separately, and jointly 
through international cooperation, to create an international enabling environ-
157. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 14.
158. General Comment No. 5, supra note 31, ¶ 5. 
159. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 24 states: “Increased efforts should be made to 
assist countries which so request to create the conditions whereby each individual can 
enjoy universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
2012 Commentary to the Maastricht Principles 1147
ment conducive to the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, 
taxation, finance, environmental protection, and development cooperation.
The compliance with this obligation is to be achieved through, inter alia:
 a) elaboration, interpretation, application and regular review of multilateral 
and bilateral agreements as well as international standards; 
 b) measures and policies by each State in respect of its foreign relations, 
including actions within international organizations, and its domestic mea-
sures and policies that can contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social 
and cultural rights extraterritorially.
Commentary
(1) Although the rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights must be progressively realized, the steps taken towards the 
full realization of the relevant rights in the Covenant “should be deliberate, 
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations 
recognized in the Covenant.”160 The language in Principle 29 reflects this 
requirement in the context of obligations of international cooperation for 
the creation of an international enabling environment. That the steps are 
to be taken “separately and jointly” is drawn from the relevant provisions 
of the UN Charter, particularly Article 56. Principle 29 also draws on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides at Article 28 that: 
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”161
(2) The UN Charter itself, the human rights treaties adopted within the 
framework of the UN, the General Assembly resolutions on a New Inter-
national Economic Order, the Declaration on the Right to Development, 
and the Millennium Declaration recognize the necessity of an international 
environment instrumental to confronting poverty, underdevelopment, and 
supporting the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights globally. 
Freeing all people from extreme poverty, the entire human race from want, 
and making the right to development a reality for everyone were central to 
the resolve of UN member states in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 “to 
create an environment—at the national and global levels alike—which is 
conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.”162 Such com-
160. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 2.
161. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 28.
162. Millennium Declaration, supra note 16, art 12. See Declaration on Right to Develop-
ment, supra note 16, art 3(1): “States have the primary responsibility for the creation 
of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to 
development.”
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mitments have implications for the interpretation of the obligations of states 
under the human rights treaties they have ratified, as they embody a practice 
by these states that sheds light upon the interpretation of the existing treaty 
provisions. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the obligation of international cooperation under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires state parties to 
the Covenant, in order to contribute to the realization of the right to adequate 
food, to address the structural causes at the international level of food inse-
curity, malnutrition, and under-nutrition referring in this regard, inter alia, to 
aspects of the international trade regime, climate change, investment, and 
the practices of international development agencies.163
(3) Principle 29 distinguishes among various duties that apply to states act-
ing separately and jointly through international cooperation to create an 
international enabling environment conducive to the universal fulfillment of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. While the appropriate management of 
the international regulatory spheres of trade, investment, taxation, finance, 
environmental, and development cooperation is critical to the creation of 
an international enabling environment where economic, social, and cultural 
rights can be realized for all, the list provided in the chapeau of Principle 
29 is not exhaustive. For instance, the realization of economic, social, and 
economic rights may have to be taken into account in intergovernmental 
arrangements concerning security or fisheries. 
(4) The second sentence of Principle 29 relates to means of compliance with 
the obligation defined in the first sentence. Point (a) highlights the different 
stages where an international enabling environment can be facilitated or 
undermined. As such, compliance with this obligation applies equally to 
the elaboration, interpretation, application, and regular review of agree-
ments and international standards.164 The reference to “interpretation” takes 
into account that interpretative practices can influence greatly the degree 
to which the international environment is supportive of human rights.165 
Point (a) applies both to legally binding international instruments and to 
agreed “international standards,” for example, the Codex Alimentarius un-
der the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. As noted above under 
Principle 17, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
repeatedly stated that international agreements concluded by states should 
163. The World Food Crisis, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 40th Sess. 
¶¶ 10, 12–13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2008/1 (2008).
164. See Commentary, Princ. 17, ¶¶ 3–5.
165. See ROBeRt HOwse, mainstReaming tHe RigHt tO DevelOPment intO inteRnatiOnal tRaDe law anD 
POlicy at tHe wORlD tRaDe ORganizatiOn, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub 2/2004/17 (2004); Robert 
Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Global Justice, Poverty, and the International Economic Order, 
in tHe PHilOsOPHy Of inteRnatiOnal law 437 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
2012 Commentary to the Maastricht Principles 1149
give due attention to economic, social, and cultural rights. (5) Point (b) 
makes clear that giving effect to the obligation to cooperate in ensuring an 
international enabling environment applies equally to measures and policies 
undertaken in respect of a state’s foreign relations, including as exercised 
through international organizations of which it is a member, and in regards 
to its internal decisions with positive external effects. An example of the 
latter are unilateral measures taken by a state to grant preferential access 
to its markets to products from low-income countries with the objective of 
facilitating the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights in those 
countries. Principle 29 complements Principle 15, which states the general 
obligation of states as members of international organizations.
30. Coordination and allocation of responsibilities.
States should coordinate with each other, including in the allocation of responsi-
bilities, in order to cooperate effectively in the universal fulfilment of economic, 
social and cultural rights. The lack of such coordination does not exonerate a 
State from giving effect to its separate extraterritorial obligations.
Commentary
(1) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly 
affirmed that international assistance and cooperation for the realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights is “particularly incumbent on those 
States in a position to assist,”166 as well as “other actors in a position to as-
sist.”167 Yet, international human rights law, at present, does not determine 
with precision a system of international coordination and allocation that 
would facilitate the discharging of obligations of a global character (in the 
meaning given to this expression under Principle 8 (b)) among those states 
“in a position to assist.” Principle 30 seeks to address this difficulty.
(2) International law recognizes a principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities among states168 and there are several examples of negotiated 
166. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 14; General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, 
¶ 45; Substantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 4 May 2001, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 25th Sess., Agenda Item 5, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 
(2001) [hereinafter Statement on Poverty]; General Comment No.17: The Right of Ev-
eryone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from 
any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he is the Author, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 35th Sess., ¶ 37, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/GC/17 (2005).
167. General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 45; Statement on Poverty, supra note 166, 
¶ 16.
168. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, ¶ 1, 9 May 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force 21 Mar. 1994).
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systems of burden-sharing established to address challenges or duties of a 
global character.169 Based on these precedents, Principle 30 affirms a pro-
cedural obligation that should be seen as complementary to the substantive 
obligation to cooperate internationally with a view to fulfilling economic, 
social, and cultural rights: the relevant states are to devise a suitable inter-
national division of responsibilities necessary to give effect to the obligation 
to cooperate in fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights throughout the 
world. Principle 30 expresses the expectation that states act in good faith 
in order to establish a system of burden-sharing in this area. Indeed, it is in 
order to facilitate this criteria and indicators to assist in the allocation of par-
ticular obligations of international assistance and cooperation—and perhaps 
in the attribution of international responsibility for failure to comply with 
international obligations to fulfill rights—are currently being developed.170
(3) As the latter part of Principle 30 provides, the lack of a clear system of 
coordination for the allocation of responsibilities does not relieve a state of 
its obligations to act separately in order to comply with its positive obliga-
tions in fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially. The 
international responsibility of each state is determined individually, on the 
basis of its own conduct, and by reference to its own international obligations.
31. Capacity and resources.
A State has the obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in its 
territory to the maximum of its ability. Each State must separately and, where 
necessary, jointly contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural 
rights extraterritorially, commensurate with, inter alia, its economic, technical 
and technological capacities, available resources, and influence in international 
169. See IDA’s Long-Term Financing Capacity, International Development Association 
Resource Mobilization (Feb. 2007) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/
Resources/IDAFinancialCapacity.pdf; Resource Scenarios 2011–2013, The Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Third Replenishment (Mar. 2010) available 
at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/publications/progress_reports/Replenish-
ment_ResourceScenarios2011To2013_Report_en/.; the shared commitment to 0.7 percent 
Gross National Income in Official Development Assistance from industrialized countries, 
which is perhaps the oldest negotiated burden-sharing scheme; or the Kyoto Protocol 
for burden-sharing in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change art. 11, ¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
22 (1998).
170. See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Millennium Development Goal 8: Indicators for International 
Human Rights Obligations?, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 966 (2006). salOmOn, supra note 16, at 193; 
Margot. E. Salomon, Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation, 
in glOBal Justice, state Duties: tHe extRa-teRRitORial scOPe Of ecOnOmic, sOcial anD cultuRal 
RigHts in inteRnatiOnal law (Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin, & 
Willem van Genugten eds.) (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Deprevation, Causation]; 
Ashfaq Khalfan, Division of Responsibility Between States, in glOBal Justice, state Duties: 
tHe extRa-teRRitORial scOPe Of ecOnOmic, sOcial anD cultuRal RigHts in inteRnatiOnal law, id. 
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decision-making processes. States must cooperate to mobilize the maximum of 
available resources for the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural 
rights.
Commentary
(1) The first sentence of Principle 31 asserts that a state possessing capac-
ity and resources to contribute to the fulfillment of economic, social, and 
cultural rights extraterritorially is not relieved of its obligation to fulfill those 
rights at home to the maximum of its ability. The wording is consistent with 
the interpretation given to the phrase “to the maximum of its available re-
sources” in Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.171 
(2) The second and third sentences of Principle 31 embody the “adequate and 
reasonable” test set out by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in order to determine whether a state party acting at the domestic 
level has failed to take steps to the maximum of its available resources in 
meeting its obligations under the Covenant.172 It could be expected a similar 
test is applicable in determining whether a state party has taken steps to 
fulfill its extraterritorial obligation. 
(3) The territorial and extraterritorial obligations of a state are separate. Ir-
respective of whether economic, social, and cultural rights have been fully 
realized for persons located in its own territory, a state could still be said 
to have positive obligations to fulfill the human rights of people outside its 
borders on the basis of an objective determination as to what constitutes 
the “adequate and reasonable” use of its available resources towards the 
realization of rights.173 
(4) Principle 31 provides that: “Each State must separately and, where neces-
sary, jointly contribute to the fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural 
rights extraterritorially.” Thus, it recognizes that meeting some aspects of the 
obligation to cooperate internationally, in fulfilling economic, social, and 
cultural rights globally, cannot be achieved by any one state on its own. 
171. General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 40. See also Commentary, Princ. 4, ¶ 3.
172. An Evaluation of the Obligations to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum Available Resources’ 
under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & 
Cult. Rts., 38th Sess., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 (2007)
173. For detailed consideration of options as to how it can be determined that a state has met 
its domestic obligations so as to give rise to extraterritorial obligations, see Salomon, 
Deprivation, Causation, supra note 170; Gorik Ooms & Rachel Hammonds, Taking up 
Daniels’ Challenge: The Case for Global Health Justice, 12 HealtH & Hum. Rts. 29, 36 
(2010); Khalfan, Division of Responsibility, supra note 170. 
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By way of example, in 1970 it was agreed “[e]ach economically advanced 
country will progressively increase its official development assistance to 
the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum 
net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by 
the middle of the decade.”174 This joint commitment has been reaffirmed in 
subsequent international declarations.175 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has affirmed this benchmark as a component necessary 
to give effect to the obligation of international assistance. In regards to state 
responsibility, in circumstances where more than one state is responsible 
for the same wrongful act, each state is separately responsible for its own 
conduct and its responsibility is not diminished by the fact it is not the only 
responsible state.176 Thus, on the matter of a truly joint obligation to cooper-
ate internationally, whereby one or several states are unable on their own 
to provide what is required to comply with the obligation, the existence of 
collective legal obligations is recognized while relying on an individualized 
regime of legal responsibility in the event of a breach of those obligations.177
(5) It follows from Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights that the states which have particular duties are 
those with economic and technical capacity. It can further be deduced from 
Article 23 of the Covenant that each state is required to promote the fulfill-
ment of economic, social, and cultural rights to the full extent of its influence 
when it comes to the “conclusion of conventions and the adoption of rec-
ommendations” that would propel “international action for the achievement 
of the rights” recognized in the Covenant, as well as those able to furnish 
technical assistance, i.e. those that have a capacity. Only one general basis 
for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation has so far 
been adopted by the Committee: international cooperation for development 
and thus for the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, while an 
obligation of all states, “is particularly incumbent upon those States which 
are in a position to assist.”178 As such, capacity is explicitly included herein 
174. International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, 
adopted 24 Oct. 1970, G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/25/2626 (1970).
175. See International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., 18–22 
March, 2002, Monetary Consensus on Financing for Development, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.257/32; Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome Document 
of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review 
the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, G.A. Res. 63/239, U.N. GAOR, 63d 
Sess., Agenda item 48, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/239 (2009).
176. Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra, note 34, art. 47, cmt. 1.
177. See Salomon, Deprivation, Causation, supra note 170.
178. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 14; General Comment No. 15, supra note 
91, ¶ 34; General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security, adopted 23 November 
2007, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 39th Sess., ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/19 (2008).
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as an important determinant in recognizing the requirement to contribute 
to the fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially. 
(6) Principle 31 indicates by the use of the term “inter alia” that capacity and 
resources do not exhaust the basis for assigning obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation. It leaves open the possibility of assigning obliga-
tions on the grounds of other bases, for example, historical responsibility or 
causation, which take a compensatory approach based on some determina-
tion of liability for contributing to a problem that undermines the fulfillment 
of economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially.179
(7) Moreover, the list of capacities and resources provided in Principle 31 
is non-exhaustive. The list begins with references to capacities explicitly 
provided for in Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“economic and technical”). The term “techni-
cal” capacity usually applies to human resources and know-how and is 
distinguished here from “technological capacities”; the latter may include, 
for example, control over technologies and intellectual property ownership, 
thereby imposing particular obligations to contribute to the fulfillment of 
economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially.
The reference to “available resources” was included to highlight that 
states that are rich in a range of resources, including human and natural 
resources, even if not high-income, may have particular obligations to con-
tribute to fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights extraterritorially on 
the basis of particular capacities. “Influence in international decision-making 
processes” is also identified as a “capacity,” and as such, states should apply 
that asset in a manner that contributes to the fulfillment of human rights 
extraterritorially. The language in Principle 31 indicates that capacity can 
take many forms and was drafted so as to explicitly take into account var-
ied forms of capacity and influence, thereby signaling that there is a wide 
range of possible states with potential obligations and that those states are 
not limited to industrialized countries. 
(8) The last sentence of Principle 31 highlights a significant procedural com-
ponent of a state’s obligation to cooperate: the requirement to cooperate 
in the mobilization of the maximum available resources for the universal 
fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights. A state is not relieved of 
179. Capacity offers both a specific and a general requirement: specific in that it is one of 
the bases that points to the requisite duty-bearers, e.g. “those in a position to assist,” 
and general in that it is a prerequisite to discharging any obligation. Thus, even if it 
were argued for example that historical responsibility should form a basis for assigning 
international obligations, but capacity would still be a necessary element in order to 
see that obligation fulfilled even when the basis is determined on some other ground.
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its obligation simply because it lacks resources. Rather, a state may be held 
internationally responsible also for a failure to have sought to mobilize the 
necessary resources globally. 
32. Principles and priorities in cooperation.
In fulfiling economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, States must:
 a) prioritize the realization of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalized 
and vulnerable groups; 
 b) prioritize core obligations to realize minimum essential levels of econom-
ic, social and cultural rights, and move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights;
 c) observe international human rights standards, including the right to self-
determination and the right to participate in decision-making, as well as the 
principles of non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality, 
transparency, and accountability; and
 d ) avoid any retrogressive measures or else discharge their burden to 
demonstrate that such measures are duly justified by reference to the full 
range of human rights obligations, and are only taken after a comprehensive 
examination of alternatives.
Commentary
(1) Principle 32 draws on the views of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the principles and priorities that should guide states in 
discharging their obligations under the Covenant: the obligation to prioritize 
the realization of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalized, and vulnerable 
groups;180 the core obligation to prioritize the “minimum essential levels” of 
economic, social, and cultural rights;181 the requirement to move as “expedi-
tiously and effectively” as possible towards the full realization of economic, 
social, and cultural rights;182 and the requirement to avoid retrogressive 
measures.183 These principles and priorities apply equally to the measures 
required to create an international enabling environment in Principle 29, 
and with regard to international assistance found in Principles 33 and 34. 
(2) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has noted states 
must pay special attention to groups who traditionally face difficulties in 
exercising economic, social, and cultural rights. The groups referred to by the 
180. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶12.
181. Id. ¶ 10.
182. Id. ¶ 9.
183. Id. 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights include disadvantaged 
and marginalized groups such as women and refugees as well as vulnerable 
groups such as children.184 The Committee has stated that “even in times 
of severe resource constraints, the most disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups can and indeed must be protected by the adoption 
of relatively low-cost targeted programmes.”185 The relevance of this obliga-
tion to international cooperation is illustrated in General Comment No. 14, 
which stipulates that: “Priority in the provision of international medical aid, 
distribution and management of resources, such as safe and potable water, 
food and medical supplies, and financial aid should be given to the most 
vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population.”186 
(3) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has elaborated 
on the obligation to prioritize the core obligations aimed at ensuring the 
minimum essential levels of rights also in the context of international co-
operation, stating that “core obligations give rise to national responsibilities 
for all States, and international responsibilities for developed States, as well 
as others that are in a ‘position to assist’”187 and, 
[w]hen grouped together, the core obligations establish an international minimum 
threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to respect . . . it is 
particularly incumbent on all those who can assist, to help developing countries 
respect this international minimum threshold. If a national or international anti-
poverty strategy does not reflect this minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with 
the legally binding obligations of the State party.188
(4) The reference in (c) to the right to self-determination signals that interna-
tional cooperation does not imply, nor does it sanction, an interventionist 
agenda by foreign states that would undermine a peoples right of self-determi-
nation by virtue of which people must be able to determine freely its political 
status and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural development, as 
well as exercise sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.189 Point 
(c) also affirms the requirement for states to abide by central human rights 
principles when cooperating to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that “the 
right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making processes, 
which may affect their development, must be an integral component of any 
184. See, e.g., General Comment No. 19, supra note 178, ¶ 31; General Comment No. 15, 
supra note 91, ¶ 16. 
185. General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone To Take Part in Cultural Life, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 43d Sess. ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (2009).
186. General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 40. 
187. Statement on Poverty, supra note 166, ¶ 16.
188. Id. ¶ 17.
189. ICESCR, supra note 4; ICCPR, supra note 5, comm. art. 1.
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policy, programme or strategy developed to discharge governmental obli-
gations.”190 To act consistently with this right, states acting extraterritorially 
must refrain from imposing conditions linked to their cooperation that would 
preclude individuals and groups from being able to have an opportunity to 
influence decision-making affecting their rights. General Comments Nos. 
15 and 19 indicate that “[i]nternational assistance should be provided in a 
manner that is consistent with the Covenant and other human rights stan-
dards, and sustainable and culturally appropriate.”191 Such obligations can 
presumably apply to the broader obligation of international cooperation. 
Finally, in keeping with Principle 2 above, any form of international coop-
eration would need also to be consistent with the fundamental principles of 
international human rights law that require non-discrimination and equality, 
including gender equality, transparency, and accountability. 
(5) As stated in point (d), the principle that retrogressive measures on the 
part of the state must be fully justified, applies equally in the context of in-
ternational assistance and cooperation. The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights takes the view that “[t]here is a strong presumption that 
retrogressive measures” taken in relation to the rights of the Covenant are 
prohibited; the burden of proof rests on the state where there is a retrogres-
sion of rights.192 In its General Comment No. 3, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights refers to the obligation to move as expeditiously 
and effectively as possible towards the full realization of economic, social, 
and cultural rights and, as elsewhere, further stipulates “any deliberately 
retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consid-
eration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources.”193 In principle, any deliberately retrogressive 
steps should be assessed against whether the state party: had reasonable 
justification for the action; undertook a comprehensive examination of alter-
natives; ensured genuine participation of affected groups in examining the 
proposed measures; determined if the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory; determined if the measures would have a sustained impact 
on the right to social security, an unreasonable impact on the right to social 
security or deprive an individual or group of the minimum essential level 
of the right, and; whether there was independent review of the measures at 
the national level.194 Such criteria are likely to apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
190. See, e.g., General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 54.
191. General Comment No. 15, supra note 91, ¶ 34; General Comment No. 19, supra note 
178, ¶ 55.
192. See, e.g., General Comment No. 19, supra note 178, ¶ 42.
193. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 9.
194. Id. ¶ 42. 
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the assessment of potentially retrogressive steps in regard to other economic, 
social, and cultural rights. 
33. Obligation to provide international assistance.
As part of the broader obligation of international cooperation, States, acting 
separately and jointly, that are in a position to do so, must provide international 
assistance to contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights 
in other States, in a manner consistent with Principle 32.
Commentary
(1) As noted above in paragraph 7 of the commentary to Principle 8, in-
ternational assistance is to be understood as a component of international 
cooperation. The undertaking in Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires states “to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, espe-
cially economic and technical.” While this provision refers in particular to 
economic and technical assistance and cooperation, it does not limit the 
undertaking to such measures. International assistance may, and depending 
on the circumstances must, comprise other measures, including provision 
of information to people in other countries, or cooperation with their state, 
for example, to trace stolen public funds or to cooperate in the adoption of 
measures to prevent human trafficking. 
34. Obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation.
A State has the obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation 
on mutually agreed terms when that State is unable, despite its best efforts, to 
guarantee economic, social and cultural rights within its territory. That State has 
an obligation to ensure that assistance provided is used towards the realization 
of economic, social and cultural rights.
Commentary
(1) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly 
called on states to seek assistance when needed to realize economic, social, 
and cultural rights.195 While the requesting state retains the prerogative to 
decline international assistance and cooperation towards those ends, where 
economic, social, and cultural rights are not being met due to lack of capac-
ity or resources, there is a strong presumption it will accept suitable support 
and the burden of justifying the rejection of assistance would rest with the 
195. Id.
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receiving state. In its interpretation of Article 2 (1) of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights considers that 
the phrase “to the maximum of its available resources” was intended 
by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing 
within a state and those available from the international community 
through international co-operation and assistance. Moreover, the es-
sential role of such cooperation in facilitating the full realization of the 
relevant rights is further underlined by the specific provisions contained 
in Articles 11, 15, 22 and 23.196
The articles discussed refer to international cooperation.
(2) While these Principles are directed to states, they do not preclude that 
states may engage in cooperation, including providing assistance, with par-
ties other than state(s); for example, groups, civil society organizations, and 
international organizations.
35. Response to a request for international assistance or cooperation.
States that receive a request to assist or cooperate and are in a position to do so 
must consider the request in good faith, and respond in a manner consistent with 
their obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially. 
In responding to the request, States must be guided by Principles 31 and 32.
Commentary
(1) Good faith is a general principle of international law that is implied 
by Article 2 (2) of the UN Charter and supported by General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Principles Governing Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States. In the context of treaty interpretation, the 
principle is mentioned in the Preamble and in Articles 26 and 31 (1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.197 A good faith consideration of 
a request for international assistance and cooperation can be understood 
as a procedural requirement for a state to comply with its obligations of 
international assistance and cooperation in the fulfillment of economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Such a requirement is a corollary of the obliga-
tion under the relevant multilateral human rights treaties for states to seek 
international assistance and cooperation when they are unable to give effect 
to their human rights obligations. 
196. General Comment No. 3, supra note 29, ¶ 13.
197. Vienna Convention, supra note 21. 
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(2) In considering requests for assistance and cooperation, states must take 
into account their available resources and capacities as addressed in Principle 
31. They must ensure the provision of assistance and cooperation is consistent 
with international human rights standards and priorities, as set out in Principle 
32. As the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has noted,
development cooperation activities do not automatically contribute to 
the promotion of respect for economic, social, and cultural rights. Many 
activities undertaken in the name of ‘development’ have subsequently 
been recognized as ill-conceived and even counter-productive in hu-
man rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence of such problems, 
the whole range of issues dealt with in the Covenant should, wherever 
possible and appropriate, be given specific and careful consideration.198 
Measures that seek to provide assistance or by which a state seeks to dis-
charge its duty to cooperate for the full realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights are to be assessed for their compliance with human rights. 
Principle 7 on informed participation and Principle 13 on the duty of states 
to avoid causing harm, are particularly relevant in this regard. 
VI. ACCOUNTAbILITY ANd REMEdIES
36.  Accountability.
States must ensure the availability of effective mechanisms to provide for ac-
countability in the discharge of their extraterritorial obligations. In order to 
ensure the effectiveness of such mechanisms, States must establish systems 
and procedures for the full and thorough monitoring of compliance with their 
human rights obligations, including through national human rights institutions 
acting in conformity with the United Nations Principles relating to the Status 
of National Institutions (Paris Principles).
Commentary
(1) Accountability is critical in regards to the implementation of the dimen-
sions of economic, social, and cultural rights that are subject to progressive 
realization because of the risk that, in the absence of adequate monitoring 
of progress, states will indefinitely postpone the adoption of such measures. 
This is particularly true for the aspects of such implementation that are ex-
traterritorial, because those affected by the actions or omissions of the state 
who are located outside the national territory shall generally have no, or 
only limited, opportunities to hold the authors of such measures accountable 
through the ordinary democratic political process. 
198. General Comment No. 2, supra note 88, ¶ 7.
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(2) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has therefore 
emphasized that states parties to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights shall develop and maintain mechanisms to moni-
tor progress towards the realization of the rights listed in the Covenant “to 
identify the factors and difficulties affecting the degree of implementation of 
their obligations, and to facilitate the adoption of corrective legislation and 
administrative measures, including measures to implement their obligations 
under Articles 2(1) and 23 of the Covenant.”199
37. General obligation to provide effective remedy.
States must ensure the enjoyment of the right to a prompt, accessible and ef-
fective remedy before an independent authority, including, where necessary, 
recourse to a judicial authority, for violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Where the harm resulting from an alleged violation has occurred on the 
territory of a State other than a State in which the harmful conduct took place, 
any state concerned must provide remedies to the victim.
To give effect to this obligation, States should:
 a) seek cooperation and assistance from other concerned States where 
necessary to ensure a remedy; 
b) ensure remedies are available for groups as well as individuals; 
 c) ensure the participation of victims in the determination of appropriate 
remedies;
 d) ensure access to remedies, both judicial and non-judicial, at the national 
and international levels; and 
 e) accept the right of individual complaints and develop judicial remedies 
at the international level.
Commentary
(1) The principle that every right must be accompanied by the availability of 
an effective remedy is a general principle of law that exists across all legal 
systems and is enshrined in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights. Any person or group of persons who is a victim of a violation 
of any of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both 
national and international levels. All victims of such violations are entitled to 
adequate reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation, 
satisfaction, or guarantees of non-repetition.
199. General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ 31.
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(2) In adopting the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly affirmed in resolution 60/147 that “the obligation to respect 
[. . .] and implement international human rights law [. . .] includes [. . .] 
the duty to [. . . p]rovide those who claim to be victims of a [. . .] violation 
with equal and effective access to justice [. . .] and [. . . to p]rovide effective 
remedies to victims.”200 Paragraph 12 of the UN Basic Principles provides:
A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effec-
tive judicial remedy as provided for under international law. Other remedies 
available to the victim include access to administrative and other bodies, as 
well as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance 
with domestic law.201 
It should be noted that under Parts I and II of the UN Basic Principles, this 
obligation to provide an effective remedy pertains to all violations, not only 
gross violations.
(3) The right to an effective remedy is contained in numerous international 
legal instruments, including most international human rights treaties and a 
number of declaratory instruments. In addition to the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, these include: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Article 2 (3)); the Convention against Torture and other Forms 
of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Articles 13 and 
14); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Article 6); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 
39); the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 25 and 63 (1)); 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 7(1)(a)); the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights (Articles 12 and 23); the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Articles 5 (5), 13 and 41); the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU (Article 47); and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 
(Article 27). Although the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights makes no express provision regarding remedy, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has reaffirmed on numerous occa-
sions that an obligation to provide remedies is inherent in the Covenant. For 
example, in General Comment 9, the Committee stated there is an 
200. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Agenda item 
71 (a), annex ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2006).
201. Id. Annex ¶ 12.
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obligation upon each State party to use all the means at its disposal to give ef-
fect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. In this respect, the fundamental 
requirements of international human rights law must be borne in mind. Thus the 
Covenant norms must be recognized in appropriate ways within the domestic 
legal order, appropriate means of redress, or remedies, must be available to any 
aggrieved individual or group, and appropriate means of ensuring governmental 
accountability must be put in place.202 
With the elaboration and adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, 
states have implicitly affirmed they expect each state party to provide effec-
tive domestic remedies, as exhaustion of such remedies is an admissibility 
requirement for accessing the communication procedure.
(4) While effective remedies for human rights violations may, in the first in-
stance, consist of administrative remedies, there should generally be recourse 
for judicial remedies as well. Thus, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has indicated that the right to an effective remedy may be 
of a judicial or administrative nature and that “whenever a Covenant right 
cannot be made fully effective without some role of the judiciary, judicial 
remedies are necessary.”203 The Human Rights Committee has stressed the 
importance of both judicial and administrative mechanisms in providing 
remedies under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
emphasizing the need for judicial remedies in cases of serious violations 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.204 The Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women takes the view 
that effective protection includes: effective legal measures, including penal 
sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory remedies, preventive measures, 
and protective measures.205 In regional contexts, the right to a “judicial” 
remedy is enshrined in Article XVIII of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man and Article 25 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court has held that 
victims must have a right to judicial remedies in accordance with the rules 
202. Draft General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, adopted 1 
Dec. 1998, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., Agenda item 3, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 
(1998). See also General Comment No. 12, supra note 12, ¶ 32; Maastricht Guidelines, 
supra note 1, at 699.
203. General Comment No 9, supra note 202, ¶ 9.
204. See Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Art. 5, Para. 4, of the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Bithashwiwa and Mulumba 
v. Zaire), U.N. CCPR, Com. No. 241/1987, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/37/D/241/1987 
(1989). Here, the Committee considered that the State had to provide the applicants 
with an effective remedy under the ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2(3), and, “in particular 
to ensure that they can effectively challenge these violations before a court of law.”
205. General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on 
Elim. of Discrim. Against Women, 11th Sess., at 1, ¶ 24(t), U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993).
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of due process of law.206 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, in its Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa, has asserted that “everyone has the right to an effec-
tive remedy by the constitution, by law or by the Charter,”207 meaning an 
effective remedy can only be truly effective if there is a judicial remedy. 
The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that while the right to 
an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights does not require a judicial remedy in all instances, whichever 
remedy is provided must offer adequate guarantees, and while the scope of 
the contracting states’ obligations vary depending on the nature of the ap-
plicant’s complaint, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” 
in practice as well as in law.208
(5) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights made it clear 
that remedies should be available at both national and international levels.209 
A number of procedures are accessible to victims of violations of human 
rights at the international level. Individual communications may be filed to 
allege violations under most universal human rights treaties, including the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Specialized 
human rights courts have been established in the European, African, and 
Americas regions. States must respect the right of the aggrieved individuals 
or groups to exercise their right to access to such grievance mechanisms 
established at the international level.210
(6) The reference to international cooperation in paragraph (a) of Principle 
37 seeks to take into account the fact that where a violation is committed in 
206. See Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 91 (26 June 1987).
207. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples Rights, princ. C (a), DOC/OS(XXX) 247, reprinted in 
12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 1180 (2005).
208. Conka v. Belgium (Appl. No. 51564/99), judgment of 5 Feb. 2002, ¶ 75.
209. See, e.g., General Comment No. 14, supra note 89, ¶ 59; General Comment No. 18, 
supra note 6, ¶ 48. See also Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 1, at 699. 
210. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 126, art. 25; American Decla-
ration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, signed 2 May 1948, O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, art. XVIII (1988); UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, 
supra note 10, art. 14; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa, adopted on 24 Oct. 2011, Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Guideline K (2011). See also the requirements that the European Court of Human 
Rights has based on the European Convention on Human Rights art. 34, 1 June, 2010, 
C.E.T.S. No. 5: Petra v. Romania, Appl. No. 27273/95, judgment of 23 September 1998, 
Reports 1998-VII, pp. 2854–55, § 43; Kurt v. Turkey Appl. No. 24276/94, judgment of 
25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, p. 1192, § 159; Aksoy v. Turkey (Appl. No. 21987/93), 
judgment of 18 Dec. 1996, Reports 1996-VI, at 2288, § 105; Akdivar and Others v. 
Turkey, Appl. No. 21893/93, judgment of 16 Sept. 1996, Reports 1996-IV, at 1219, § 
105.
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State B as a result of a measure adopted on the territory of State A, specific 
obstacles arise for victims seeking a remedy, imposing correlative duties on 
the states concerned to cooperate with a view to removing such obstacles. 
This is the case, for instance, where the branch or subsidiary of one trans-
national corporation operates in State B, but where the parent company is 
domiciled in State A. It has been noted with reference to such a situation that:
The violations committed by the transnational corporations in their mainly 
transboundary activities do not come within the competence of a single state 
and, to prevent contradictions and inadequacies in the remedies and sanctions 
decided upon by states individually or as a group, these violations should form 
the subject of special attention. The States and the international community 
should combine their efforts so as to contain such activities by the establishment 
of legal standards capable of achieving that objective.211 
Further guidance on the duty to cooperate in this context is provided by 
Principle 27 and its accompanying Commentary.
38. Effective remedies and reparation.
Remedies, to be effective, must be capable of leading to a prompt, thorough 
and impartial investigation; cessation of the violation if it is ongoing; and ad-
equate reparation, including, as necessary, restitution, compensation, satisfac-
tion, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition. To avoid irreparable harm, 
interim measures must be available and states must respect the indication of 
interim measures by a competent judicial or quasi-judicial body. Victims have 
the right to truth about the facts and circumstances surrounding the violations, 
which should also be disclosed to the public, provided that it causes no further 
harm to the victim.
Commentary
(1) Under international law, the right to a remedy entails the right to re-
ceive reparation for harm incurred as the result of a violation.212 The right 
211. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Final Report on the Ques-
tion of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), prepared by Mr. El Hadji Guissé, Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Sub-
Commission resolution 1996/24, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on 
the Prev. of Discrim & Protect. of Min., 49th Sess., Agenda Item 4, ¶ 131, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8 (1997).
212. UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, supra note 10, art. 24. See also Updated 
Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to 
Combat Impunity, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 61st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 
17, princ. 31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005) (hereinafter UN Impunity 
Principles): 
Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or 
her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the possibility 
for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.” 
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to reparation, which covers all injuries suffered by victims,213 includes the 
right to restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees 
of non-repetition, as reflected in international standards including the UN 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation and 
the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through action to Combat Impunity.214 The right to truth, which is an inherent 
component of satisfaction, has been established under the UN Principles 
and Guidelines and in several resolutions of the UN Human Rights Com-
mission and Council.215 
(2) The principles on reparation acknowledge the key role and participation 
of the victim in crafting a remedy. Effective restitution and satisfaction, in 
particular, will have to be tailored to individual needs. 
39. Inter-State complaints mechanisms.
States should avail themselves of, and cooperate with, inter-State complaints 
mechanisms, including human rights mechanisms, to ensure reparation for any 
violation of an extraterritorial obligation relating to economic, social and cul-
tural rights. States should seek reparation in the interest of injured persons as 
beneficiaries under the relevant treaties addressing economic, social and cultural 
rights, and should take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured 
persons with regard to the reparation to be sought. Reparation for the injuries 
obtained from the responsible State should be transferred to the injured persons.
Commentary
(1) Inter-state complaints mechanisms that can address extraterritorial obliga-
tions include the International Court of Justice, inter-state communication 
procedures established under most of the international and regional human 
rights treaties, and ad hoc international arbitration that may be established 
by the parties to a dispute. Although Principle 39 uses the term “should,” the 
steps set out in this Principle are legally required in certain circumstances 
described below. A state’s obligation to realize economic, social, and cultural 
rights within its territory requires it to take steps to prevent and mitigate 
213. Id.; Princ. 34: “The right to reparation shall cover all injuries suffered by victims.” 
214. UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, supra note 10, arts. 18–23; UN Impunity 
Principles, supra note 212, Princ. 34: “The right to reparation . . . shall include measures 
of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction as provided by international 
law.”
215. UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, supra note 10, art. 22(b): 
Satisfactions should include . . . verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth 
to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and interests 
of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim 
or prevent the occurrence of further violations.
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violations by other states that affect its inhabitants. Such steps can include 
diplomatic means or legal complaints. Recourse to legal means is essential 
when other alternatives have been exhausted and in such cases the territorial 
state must provide for, and avail itself, of inter-state complaint mechanisms.
(2) In some situations, the obligation of all states concerned to ensure the 
right to remedy as set out in Principle 37 may only be feasible through an 
inter-state complaint mechanism or through an inquiry process (described 
in Principle 41 below). Such states concerned are the state(s) alleged to 
be responsible for the conduct constituting a violation and the state(s) in 
which the impact of the harmful conduct is felt. An inter-state complaint 
mechanism or inquiry process may be the only feasible forums to address the 
violation in circumstances where victims of a violation are unable to seek 
remedy themselves, for example, due to fear of retaliation or lack of access 
to information or legal aid. In such cases, the states concerned must accept 
the competence of a relevant international or regional mechanism to hear 
the complaint and cooperate with it. Such cooperation includes observing 
the procedures of the complaint mechanism, acting in good faith through-
out the process, and taking all feasible steps to redress the non-compliance 
identified by the mechanism. 
(3) When taking forward a complaint in regard to the violation of the rights 
of particular victims to give effect to the victim’s right to a remedy to the 
extent possible, states should consult with the victims or with the genuine 
representatives of the communities affected by the violation.
(4) Human rights impose obligations erga omnes: all states have a legal in-
terest in their fulfillment and all states to which these obligations are owed 
will be injured by breaches of human rights obligations irrespective of the 
nationality or place of residence of the victims.216 Moreover, human rights 
treaties also are contractual in nature: any state party to a treaty is obligated 
to every other state party to comply with its undertakings in accordance with 
the treaty.217 Although states that do not have a close link to the victim are 
not legally required to claim a remedy on the victim’s behalf, they may and 
should seek to do so where possible. 
40. Non-judicial accountability mechanisms.
In addition to the requisite judicial remedies, States should make non-judicial 
remedies available, which may include, inter alia, access to complaints mecha-
216. See Commentary, Princ. 8, ¶ 4.
217. General Comment No. 31, supra note 50, ¶ 2.
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nisms established under the auspices of international organizations, national 
human rights institutions or ombudspersons, and ensure that these remedies 
comply with the requirements of effective remedies under Principle 37. States 
should ensure additional accountability measures are in place at the domestic 
level, such as access to a parliamentary body tasked with monitoring govern-
mental policies, as well as at the international level.
Commentary
(1) Principles 37 and 38 concern the requirement of states to ensure access 
to effective remedies in principle of a judicial nature. Principle 40 provides 
a non-exhaustive list of mechanisms that could supplement judicial rem-
edies. Non-judicial accountability mechanisms in some cases may be more 
accessible to victims, and they may provide speedier resolutions of the is-
sues presented. In addition, their working methods may be more flexible, 
they may more easily address problems of a collective or structural nature, 
and they may more easily enter into various forms of collaboration with 
the other branches of the state to provide effective redress and to ensure 
that the violations denounced shall cease and shall not be repeated. These 
are among the reasons that have led the Principles relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (The Paris Principles), adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993, to include a number of principles 
concerning the status of human rights commissions with quasi-jurisdictional 
competence. These principles may be referred to in order to define the 
competence of national institutions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights, established in conformity with the Paris Principles, to receive 
individual or group complaints or petitions. 
(2) Further guidance is offered by the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 
17/4. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights state that 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms, both state-based and non-state-based, 
should present a number of characteristics in order to provide an effective 
contribution to improving accountability, particularly in the context of the 
activities of corporations that have an impact on the enjoyment of human 
rights. These mechanisms, the Guiding Principles state, should be legitimate, 
accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, the source 
of continuous learning, and based on engagement and dialogue.
41. Reporting and monitoring.
States must cooperate with international and regional human rights mecha-
nisms, including periodic reporting and inquiry procedures of treaty bodies and 
mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council, and peer review mechanisms, on 
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the implementation of their extraterritorial obligations in relation to economic, 
social and cultural rights, and redress instances of non-compliance as identified 
by these mechanisms.
Commentary
(1) States that are party to the relevant human rights treaties are legally 
bound to report, periodically, to these mechanisms and should respond 
to queries in accordance with the applicable procedures. States that have 
accepted the competence of the relevant treaty bodies to carry out inquiry 
procedures should act in accordance with the procedures applicable to such 
inquiries. States should participate in the Human Rights Council’s Universal 
Peer Review process and in other international and regional peer review 
processes that can monitor their compliance with human rights standards. 
Further, states should facilitate monitoring of their human rights performance 
by cooperating with the Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures and 
human rights monitoring mechanisms established under regional organiza-
tions. Such cooperation includes facilitating visits and responding in a full 
and timely fashion to the communications from monitoring mechanisms. 
(2) The reporting and monitoring carried out under these processes supple-
ments complaint mechanisms, as they permit monitoring bodies to address 
the systemic impacts of state conduct on economic, social, and cultural 
rights. As stated in the commentary to Principle 39, the obligation of all 
states concerned to ensure the right to remedy for violations may in certain 
circumstances be feasible only through an inter-state complaint mechanism 
or through an inquiry process. In such instances, a state must therefore 
accept the competence of a relevant international mechanism to hear the 
complaint and cooperate with it.
VII. fINAL PROVISIONS
42. States, in giving effect to their extraterritorial obligations, may 
only subject economic, social and cultural rights to limitations when 
permitted under international law and where all procedural and 
substantive safeguards have been satisfied.
Commentary
(1) Principle 42 recognizes that international instruments that form the basis 
for extraterritorial obligations in relation to economic, social, and cultural 
rights restrict the limitations to such rights. Such treaties, and their interpre-
tation by courts and treaty monitoring bodies, also provide for a range of 
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safeguards in the event a limitation is proposed. For example, Article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides 
that states parties may subject economic, social, and cultural rights “only 
to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be 
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.” Examples of pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards are those elaborated by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in regard to forced evictions,218 
interferences with the right to water,219 and retrogressive measures affecting 
the right to social security.220 
(2) The Limburg Principles clarify that Article 4 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was primarily intended to be protec-
tive of the rights of individuals and was not meant to introduce limitations 
on rights affecting the subsistence or survival of the individual or integrity of 
the person.221 The Limburg Principles also specify that limitations may not be 
arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory nor may they be interpreted or ap-
plied so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.222 Furthermore, 
legal rules limiting the exercise of economic, social, and cultural rights must 
be clear and accessible and provide for safeguards and effective remedies 
against illegal or abusive imposition or application of limitations.223 
43. Nothing in these Principles should be read as limiting or 
undermining any legal obligations or responsibilities that states, 
international organizations and non-state actors, such as transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, may be subject to under 
international human rights law.
44. These principles on the extraterritorial obligations of states may 
not be invoked as a justification to limit or undermine the obligations 
of the state towards people on its territory.
218. General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 16th Sess., ¶ 13–16, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1997).
219. General Comment No. 15, supra note 91, ¶ 56. 
220. See Commentary, Princ. 32, ¶ 5. 
221. The Limburg Principles, supra note 1, ¶¶ 46–47. 
222. Id. ¶¶ 49, 56.
223. Id. ¶¶ 50–51.
